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Abstract 
Why do human beings, on Aristotle’s view, have an innate tendency to badness, that is, to 
developing desires that go beyond  and against their natural needs? Given Aristotle’s teleological 
assumptions (including the thesis that nature does nothing in vain), such tendency should not be 
present. I argue that the culprit is to be found in the workings of rationality, in particular in the 
(necessary) presence of theoretical reason. As theoretical reason requires that human beings have 
unlimited non-rational desires for the fine (to kalon), it also gives rise to a tendency to form 
unlimited non-rational desires for other things. 
 
Keywords 
evil; rationality; desire; teleology; human nature 
 
1. The Problem 
According to Aristotle, human beings not only commonly develop desires (appetites) for 
unnecessary pleasures (e.g. NE 7.4, 1147b25-1148a30; 7.7, 1150a16-25), but also exhibit inherent 
proneness to bad desires, that is desires (necessary or not) that go beyond what is good and healthy 
for them (e.g. NE 2.9, 1109b1-12). This tendency to badness is neither rare nor mild. In comments 
echoing Plato’s pessimism in the Republic, Aristotle tells us that ‘as a human being is the best of the 
animals when perfected, so he is also the worst of all when separated from law and justice’ (Pol. 
1.2, 1253a31-3). Devoid of virtue, human beings are ‘the most unholy and the most savage and the 
worst when it comes to sex and food’ (Pol. 1.2, 1253a35-7). In saying this, Aristotle does not mean 
to assert (in what would be something like a reverse Rousseaunian fashion) that human beings used 
to be (when in their natural state) ‘unholy and savage’ but that once they formed societies, their 
nature underwent transformation and they became civilized. On the contrary, he thinks that the 
constant presence and threat of law is what keeps mankind from sinking back into savagery (NE 
10.9, 1179b32-1180a14). As he sees it, in order to prevent the inherent tendency to badness to take 
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over, ‘the many’ must ‘receive corrective treatment by pain, just like a beast of burden’ (NE 10.9, 
1180a13). Like Plato, Aristotle also holds that there are indeed exceptional people whose natural 
(inborn) traits incline them to goodness. Such people can, in appropriate and fortunate 
circumstances, develop virtue and escape the inner savagery. Nevertheless, just like Plato (Rep. 
491e), Aristotle also believes that it is precisely these people that have the greatest potential for 
becoming evil since their natural proclivity towards virtue also best equips them for vice (Pol. 1.2, 
1252a33-5).1 
 But why should human beings have a pronounced tendency to develop desires that go 
beyond what is natural, healthy and good for them? As Aristotle sees it, human beings are so prone 
to badness that, in the end, mankind’s actual condition is better characterized in terms of badness 
and unhealthiness than in terms of goodness and healthiness.2 The question is pressing in view of 
the fact that, on Aristotle’s view, things are arranged quite differently in the case of non-human (or 
non-rational) animals. Aristotle sees non-rational animals as equipped with physiological and 
psychological capacities that are of the right sort to enable them to live fulfilling lives as the kinds 
of animal they are. The psychological capacities and physiological organs of animals form well-
ordered systems that are (individually as well as taken together as a whole) well-suited to fulfill the 
animal’s natural needs (e.g. PA 3.14, 675b11-13). This is by no means a coincidence: nature works 
that way. It not only does nothing in vain but all it does has a purpose.3 The purpose is to provide 
the optimal or best arrangement of the various traits or features for a given living being4 insofar as 
 
1 See also NE 6.13, 1144b8-12. 
2 Nowhere do we find the expression οἱ πολλοί to refer to those who are good and of sound mind. On the 
contrary, the many are regularly characterized by both Plato (e.g. Rep. 431c) and Aristotle (e.g. NE 9.4, 
1666b2) as φαῦλοι (‘base’). Both Plato and Aristotle are also quite clear that οἱ πολλοί are φαῦλοι because of 
various deficiencies of character, primarily the fact that they are driven by (mostly bad) appetitive desires 
rather than reason. For an instructive discussion of the status of οἱ πολλοί in Aristotle see Garrett 1993.  
3 Aristotle does not think that everything in nature has a purpose. As he recognizes, there are by-products of 
teleological processes (DA 3.12, 434a31-2) which may but need not be put to use (e.g. bile around the liver 
has no use or purpose: PA 4.2, 677a16-18). Hence, the claim about nature not doing anything in vain should 
be understood as being constrained to natural processes rather than applicable to all possible outcomes or 
effects of such processes.  
4 It is not the case that animal organs or features are, as a matter of fact, always best at accomplishing their 
individual roles. Certain features can impose restrictions on the kinds of further traits that animals can, as a 
matter of fact, have. For example, snakes cannot have limbs because as blooded animals they cannot have 
more than four limbs (HA 1.5, 490a26-b1), but having four (or fewer) limbs would, in view of their length 
(which Aristotle treats as essential part of their nature), render them immobile (IA 708a9-13). Hence, although 
having many limbs (like a centipede) would be better for them (i.e. they would move better than they do now 
with no limbs), the fact that they are blooded precludes them from having any. On this point, see the detailed 
discussion in Henry 2013, 235-41. 
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that is, given various circumstances and constraints (biological or material), possible. As Aristotle 
says (IA 704b15-7):5 
 
(A) Nature does (ποιεῖ) nothing in vain, but always the best possible concerning each kind of 
living being by reference to its substantial being (τῇ οὐσίᾳ).  
 
On Aristotle’s view, living beings have the features or traits they have either because they are 
necessary (say, for the animal to survive) or because having them is beneficial (say, to the animal’s 
well-being) (GA 1.4, 717a15-6).6 In either case, as passage A makes clear, nature selects or provides 
living beings with those traits or features that it is best for them to have, given the kind of organisms 
that they are and the options available.7  
 As Aristotle sees it, then, every kind of animal has certain natural needs – it needs a 
particular kind of nourishment, a particular kind of shelter to enable it to live safely and reproduce, 
and it requires certain kinds of social structures. The way things are arranged in nature, it also so 
happens that every non-rational animal has capacities that reliably and systematically track those 
needs and are well suited for the kind of life it needs (PA 1.5, 645b14-20).8 Importantly, this 
concerns not only the physical constitution of animals (in this respect, human beings are in fact not 
different), but also their psychological traits, their cognition and desires. Animal desires – their size, 
intensity and frequency – directly relate to the size and shape of their internal organs. For example, 
the larger stomach an animal has, the larger are its appetites (i.e. for larger amounts of food), while 
the more straight intestines it has, the more frequently it feels appetitive desires for food (esp., PA 
3.14, 675b25-8). Similarly, sexual desires depend on the size and shape of the relevant organs, such 
as testes (e.g. GA 1.4, 717a13-b13). Since animals have the kind of organs (and their arrangements) 
they have because it is good for them to have them (i.e. it is either necessary or beneficial), it 
 
5 There is no shortage of passages of this sort. See, for example, IA 708a9-13; PA 3.1, 661b27-35; GA 1.4, 
717a17-8; 2.6, 744a37-b2; or Pol. 1.2, 1252b2-1253a10. For detailed and contrasting discussions of the 
principle and the role it plays in Aristotle’s philosophy, see Lennox 2001; Henry 2013; Gottlieb and Sober 
2017. 
6 For a discussion of these two factors in animal design, see Leunissen 2011. 
7 This is most apparent in the Generation of Animals where Aristotle repeatedly argues that animals have the 
kind of organs or traits they have and develop them in the way they do ‘because it is better’ that it be so (e.g. 
GA 4.1, 766a5-10). Here I follow the view defended in Henry 2013, 241-3. 
8 There are controversies concerning the nature of Aristotle’s explanation of the optimal arrangement of the 
capacities and organs of animals in relation to their environment. For my purposes, I do not need to enter the 
controversy. See Sedley 2007, 184-204; Lennox 2010; Gelber 2015.  
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follows that the kind of appetites they form, in consequence of having such organs, are also good 
for them (i.e. either necessary or beneficial).9  
 No reader of Aristotle’s biological works can miss the fact that Aristotle often attributes 
various good and bad qualities of character to animal species (e.g. HA 1.1, 488b11-24). For 
example, he describes certain animals as exceedingly voracious or gluttonous, such as fish (PA 
3.14, 675a19-24), dolphins (PA 4.13, 696b27-30) and snakes (HA 8.4, 594a5-6). However, the 
gluttony of such animals should not be understood in terms of imperfection or unhealthy, bad 
condition. As Aristotle reminds us, the attribution of such qualities to animals is metaphorical and 
done in comparing one kind of animal to another in respect of some quality and not by comparing 
an individual animal vis-à-vis the ideal of its kind (NE 7.6, 1149b24-1150a8). In other words, in 
attributing bad qualities to certain species (like gluttony, sluggishness or treachery) Aristotle does 
not mean to say that those species regularly fail to achieve their normatively correct development. 
Rather, these seemingly bad qualities belong to the fully developed and healthy natural states of 
those species.10 Each animal kind has precisely the kind of appetites it has (whether we call them 
gluttonous, moderate or mild) because it is good (either necessary or beneficial) for it to have such 
 
9 There is one case that might be thought to be problematic, namely that of Selachians and dolphins (PA 4.13, 
696b24-33). The ‘gluttony’ of these species looks like a built-in imperfection since, if left unchecked, they 
would perish ‘on account of being quickly filled’ (PA 4.13, 696b32). The passage is subject to a number of 
controversies, most notably concerning whether the mechanism that prevents the bad consequence – the fact 
that, given the position of their mouth, they need to turn on their back to catch their prey and in so doing let 
some fish escape (PA 4.13, 696b27-30; HA 8.2, 591b30-1) – is to be explained by reference to the animal’s 
own good (e.g. Leunissen 2010, 43-7; Balme 1987a, 278-9 and 1987b, 299) or to the good of other animal 
species (Cooper 2004b, 127); and if to other animals’ good whether that commits (or expresses) Aristotle’s 
commitment to global teleology (e.g. Sedley 2010, 24). For our purposes, the important issue is whether 
Aristotle is really attributing to them gluttony in the sense of desire for excessive amounts of food and 
overeating (as is it is often assumed, say, Leunissen 2010, 44). The first thing to note is that insofar as sharks 
and dolphins are concerned, ‘being gluttonous’ is what is natural and necessary for them ‘owing to the 
arrangements for the reduction of their food being very imperfect, and much of it consequently passing 
through them without undergoing concoction … For as the passage of food in such cases is rapid, and the 
enjoyment derived from it in consequence but brief, it follows of necessity that the return of appetite is also 
speedy’ (PA 675a19-24). They are thus not ‘gluttonous’ in the way in which human beings can be said to be 
so but, rather, they are animals that must process food in a way that leads to frequent feelings of hunger. 
Second, their appetites are not said to be harmful to them in the sense of being excessive. Rather, given their 
hunting prowess, the ‘gluttonous’ nature of Selachians and dolphins would lead them to ‘be sated quickly’. 
The most likely explanation of why ‘being sated quickly’ would lead to their demise is that rapid satisfaction 
of their hunger would result in an over-abundance of nutriment preventing digestion (PA 3.7, 670b6-7). In 
other words, it is not that they would eat too much in relation to how much they (actually) need or require to 
eat, but that they would eat too quickly for their digestion. Accordingly, their nature implements a device that 
prevents such quick eating, making sure that they eat at a speed appropriate to their digestive track. If this 
explanation is along the right lines, the Selachians’ and dolphins’ appetitive desire to eat is not 
disproportionate to their healthy need of nourishment. 
10 Here I agree with Thein 2017, 74.  
5 
 
appetites. In sum, non-rational animals’ desires reliably track their needs and so, as a result, they 
desire and find pleasant what is natural and good for them. As Aristotle says, ‘all animals pursue 
pleasure in accordance with nature’ (HA 7.1, 589a8-9).  
 On this picture, then, if all goes well in a non-rational animal’s development (and in nature 
it often, although not always, does), the animal will evolve in such a way as to provide for itself in 
the right way and it will live a good life of its species. Aristotle is well aware, of course, that things 
can sometimes go badly (Phys. 2.6, 196b11-32). But when they do, it is only because of some 
external circumstances (Phys. 2.7, 198b4-6; 2.8, 199a8-26) that impede, warp or otherwise harm a 
particular animal’s development (such as injury, droughts, change of climate, invasion of other 
animals, abuse by human beings and so on). But barring such external influences, an animal will 
develop as it should and it will desire what it needs and what benefits it (e.g. PA 1.1, 641b12-26).11 
In other words, non-rational animals overwhelmingly reach (or significantly approximate) the ideal 
development (both physical and psychological) in accordance with their essential forms.  
 So why does it not work this way in the case of human beings? Why do human beings 
regularly develop desires that go beyond their natural needs, that are excessive and do not benefit 
them?12 There is what might seem an obvious answer to this question – it is the unlimited nature of 
human appetites (i.e. the animal-like part of our nature) that is responsible for human propensity 
towards badness: ‘the wickedness of human beings is insatiable … since the nature of their appetite 
is unlimited.’13 One way to understand this claim as follows. It is in the nature of human non-
rational desires, especially of appetites, that they are insatiable and indiscriminate when not 
controlled by reason. Their repeated exercise makes them grow larger and larger, that is, ever more 
excessive (NE 3.12, 1119b3-15). But this answer does not help, since the question is why nature 
would equip us with appetites of that (unlimited) sort in the first place.14 Aristotle never attributes 
 
11 On this point, see esp. Gottlieb and Sober 2017, 252-4. 
12 Generally, I will use the expression ‘natural needs’ to refer to human needs insofar as they stem from the 
‘animal’ aspect of human nature, that is, to human nutritive and reproductive needs insofar as such needs are 
beneficial and healthy. Of course, since human beings also have a different nature, namely intellectual one in 
virtue of which they share in the divine, they have needs related to that nature too. Whenever necessary, I will 
make the distinction clear.  
13 Pol. 2.7, 1267b1-4 (cf. Pol. 1257b37-1258a3). See, for example, Smith 1996, 66. 
14 In Pol. 1.9, 1258b37-a7, Aristotle describes the cause of the limitless pursuit of wealth (i.e. of the kind of 
pursuit motivated by unlimited appetites) either as lying in the preoccupation with living (τὸ σπουδάζειν περὶ 
τὸ ζῆν) rather than with living well (εὖ ζῆν), or in thinking that bodily pleasures constitute living well (and 
consequently pursuing them as such). In both cases, the initial desire (for mere living or bodily pleasure) is 
said to be unlimited or excessive. That is why, Aristotle claims, those who pursue it also think that they need 
to secure as much of the things that promote its satisfaction as possible. The limitless nature of the initial 
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unlimited nature to appetites of non-rational animals even as, presumably, animal appetites can also 
grow larger with repeated exercise. Moreover, insofar as human beings are physiologically 
comparable to other animals, their digestive system is not like that of particularly voracious or 
gluttonous animals, such as fish or snakes – but more like that of dogs or pigs, that is, moderate in 
comparison (HA 1.16, 495b24-31; 2.17, 507b18-28). Hence, from the physiological point of view, it 
is unclear why human appetites should be of the kind Aristotle describes, namely unlimited, 
indiscriminate and insatiable. Finally, given that human appetites are indeed of the sort Aristotle 
describes, why does nature not employ some device to curb them? For example, dolphins have 
(necessarily) appetites which, if they were left unchecked, could harm them. However, nature 
employs devices (for example, a particular shape of the mouth) to systematically contain those 
appetites and prevent them from causing harm.15 One might say, then, that there is no obvious 
biological explanation for the nature of human appetites. And yet there should be. After all, as 
Aristotle asserts, we should be able to say why it is either necessary or beneficial for human beings 
to have such desires. 
 So why do human beings develop and have appetites and desires that seem neither 
necessary nor beneficial to them? Do they develop them because of some external circumstances 
(just as other animals do) or because of something internal to human nature? This is not an 
empirical question about the way in which some particular person (or persons) has (or have), or can, 
become bad.16 It is also not a question about what constitutes a particular type of bad character, such 
as vice, or a question about how one can make sense of bad or evil character and behavior.17 The 
question is, rather, whether there is something about the way in which human beings are 
(psychologically) constituted such that bad desires, and so various deviations from virtuous 
development, including vice, are necessarily always an option for them, and which, if not ruled out 
in some way, can very well become real in each and every one of them.18  
 
desire thus explains the behavior of pursuing wealth without constraint. The question raised above concerns 
the nature of the initial desire: why should it be unlimited? 
15 See n. 9 above. 
16 On the nature of bad habituation, see esp. Kontos 2014 and Barney 2019. 
17 For a discussion of this issue in ancient philosophy (though not in Aristotle), see Kamtekar 2019.  
18 Stephen White argues the opposite thesis. According to his interpretation, Aristotle thinks that ‘we all tend 
naturally to develop and acquire them [i.e. features of natural virtue]. Having natural virtue, in short, should 
be the usual condition, and only external interference that disrupts the normal process should hinder or 
prevent its development’ (White 1992, 160). 
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 A preliminary clarification is in order. In characterizing human beings as being prone to 
badness or evil, I avoid saying that Aristotle thought that human nature is bad since he clearly 
thought that when considered as an ideal or paradigm, human nature is good. His position (that 
human nature is good) is compatible with most people not being good or virtuous as a matter of 
fact, or with there being a need to bring about the ideal development through moral education in an 
appropriately governed society. It would also not be quite correct to say that Aristotle thought that 
human nature tends towards badness or evil since one can understand this claim in several different 
ways. On the one hand, one could mean that human beings more often than not desire what they 
believe to be bad or evil as such (that is, because it is bad or evil). But Aristotle did not hold this 
view.19 On the other hand, one might mean that some things are objectively good or bad (or are so 
for human beings) and that human beings tend to find or believe (mistakenly) that that which is bad 
is good.20 This is closer to what I mean but it still needs to be qualified since Aristotle did not think 
that it happens in all circumstances. Rather, he thought that in certain conditions (for example, in 
his ideal state), the opposite is true – at least for some people.21 My question can be usefully 
 
19 Almost no philosophers did. Some philosophers have argued that one need not be attracted to what one 
believes to be good (Stocker 1979; Velleman 1992) but they have not denied that an agent, in acting as she 
does, does not see her action as having some merit. David Sussman has argued for the possibility of ‘truly 
perverse action’ (Sussman 2019, 617) which he conceives of as one in which an agent acts for the sake of 
some apparent evil (say, because it is morally wrong to act that way). But even he denies that one can have ‘a 
fundamental commitment to doing so’ (618), confining the possibility of acting for the sake of the bad to 
particular actions. One philosopher who seems to me to have embraced such (normative) commitment to 
badness is the Marquis de Sade: ‘il est très doux de scandaliser: il existe là un petit triomphe pour l’orgueil 
qui n’est nullement à dédaigner’ (de Sade 1998a, 134). One reason behind de Sade’s emphasis on our 
enjoyment of shocking, scandalous and outright criminal kinds of behavior (including physically harming 
others) is that, according to de Sade, the laws of nature give us too little freedom and so unacceptably 
constrain our happiness. Hence: ‘loin de remercier cette nature inconséquente du peu de liberté qu’elle nous 
donne pour accomplir les penchants inspires par sa voix, blasphémons-la, du fond de notre coeur, de nous 
avoir autant rétréci la carrière qui remplit ses vues; outrageons-la, détrisons-la, pour nous avoir laisse si peu 
de crimes à faire, en donnant de si violents désirs d’en commettre à tous les instants’ (de Sade 1998b, 885). 
Although one could argue that even de Sade justifies evil behavior by an appeal to something thought to be 
good (freedom, happiness), his position is not that what one generally or conventionally thinks is bad is in fact 
good but, rather, that freedom and happiness requires embracing the evil aspects of human desires as such (i.e. 
as evil and contrary to laws of nature and morality) since it is only then that their satisfaction brings freedom 
and happiness. 
20 Here I refer both to conditions in which people have mistaken views about what is good (as vicious people 
do) as well as conditions in which they find some things attractive (say, because of pleasure) despite believing 
them to be bad otherwise (as uncontrolled people do).  
21 On some views, Aristotle (or Plato) could be indeed thought to hold that human nature is bad. For example, 
Eric Schwitzgebel writes that a ‘trait is natural to an individual just in case it arises in that individual through 
a normal process of development in a normal, nutritive environment, rather than as a result of injury, acquired 
disease, malnutrition, or (especially) external imposition’ (2007, 148-9). On his view, Plato and Aristotle 
could be thought to think that human nature is bad, provided that the adjective ‘normal’ is understood in a 
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understood as trying to get at the explanation of how it could be that human nature needs those 
special conditions to flourish and even in those it flourishes only in select few. It is thus a question 
not only about the character-state vice (kakia), but about the origin (and possibility) of the 
particularly human (innate) tendency to bad or harmful desires.22 On Aristotle’s view, the presence 
of such desires characterizes various non-virtuous states of character,23 including vice,24 
beastliness,25 self-control, and lack of control.  
 One can usefully contrast the problem I want to address with a set of problems that arise 
from tensions between Aristotle’s general teleological commitments and his descriptions of animal 
physiology. One such problem concerns the tension between Aristotle’s teleological principles on 
the basis of which one might think that no deformity should ever happen (since ‘nature does nothing 
in vain’) and Aristotle’s acknowledgment of the fact that the development of an individual animal 
can end up in the animal’s being deformed, or otherwise less than ideally developed. Aristotle 
solves this problem by locating the cause of the deformity in the material cause. The animal form or 
nature fails to achieve its full completion due to the resistance of the material cause (GA 4.4, 770b9-
17).26 In other words, the animal is deformed due to circumstances that are external to its nature 
(such as unfavorable environmental conditions). An even more serious problem concerns the 
existence of whole animal kinds that are deformed. A deformed kind or species implies a regularity 
in the production of a given deformation that should not occur: in the framework of Aristotle’s 
 
roughly descriptive sense (as that which is prevalent as things stand) or in a socially normative sense (as that 
which is considered as appropriate in a society). 
22 As far as I am aware, there has not been any sustained discussion of the question I raise in the literature. 
Even the recently edited volume on the topic of evil in Aristotle (Kontos 2018a) contains no paper that 
addresses it (which can, however, be explained by its somewhat different focus). The question is raised, in a 
slightly different form, by Thomas Gould who sees that the existence of bad desires offers ‘a threat to his [i.e. 
Aristotle’s] analysis of the nature of all motion as inevitably aimed toward a true good’ (Gould 1971, 455). 
He asks: ‘What is it that enables us to say of men alone … that some of their strivings are good and some 
bad?’ (452). Gould’s own solution is, however, difficult to discern, although it is clear that he thinks it has to 
do with rationality always presenting two or more options for action. Besides the vast literature on virtue, lack 
of control and to some extent vice, scholars have mostly concentrated on Aristotle’s discussion of the 
metaphysical nature of badness in Metaphysics 9.9. See, for example, Beere 2012, 325-52; Katz and Polansky 
2006; Reeve 2018; or Goldin 1993. 
23 Kontos 2014 contains a valuable discussion of the topology of the non-virtuous states in Aristotle, 
concentrating on their particular intellectual components. 
24 That the vicious agent has bad desires is a common ground for interpreters who might otherwise disagree 
about further aspects of Aristotle’s account of the vicious agent. See Müller 2015b, Nielsen 2017 and Barney 
2019. 
25 Beastliness has not been the focus of much discussion, but see now Kontos 2018b and Pearson 2018. 
26 For a discussion of cases of this sort, see Johnson 2005, 198-204. 
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teleological principles deformations of nature are intelligible only as exceptions. It is not necessary 
for my purposes to enter the complex nature of this problem and the debates that surround it. 
However, it is worth emphasizing that, even in this case, the source of deformity is found in 
something external to the animal’s nature. In other words, the animals (of a given kind) are 
deformed because they do not develop or use their organs in accordance with their own nature. In 
fact, their nature functions as the norm in relation to which one can judge the animal as deformed.27  
 The problem I raise is different from either of these issues since there is no evidence that 
Aristotle thinks that human beings are (as a species) deformed. Nevertheless, unlike all other 
animals, they regularly end up with desires, habits, and mindsets that are not natural for them (since 
they are neither necessary nor useful) and can even be (and often are) detrimental to their own well-
being. In a way, this is a more difficult problem for Aristotle’s teleology since it would appear that 
there is a case in which nature works perfectly well but nevertheless creates something 
fundamentally flawed. For the sake of brevity, I call it the Problem of Ethical Imperfection (PEI).  
 
2. Method and Plan of the Paper 
In general terms, the cause of PEI is not a mystery. Since, on Aristotle’s view, the primary 
difference between human beings and animals is the presence of the capacity for thinking, it is 
plausible to suppose that the answer will have to with the effects of rationality on other human 
psychological capacities, and in particular on (non-rational) desires. This hypothesis can be given 
the following justification. Aristotle thinks that the capacities of living beings are distributed among 
the various species in a way that forms an ordered, developing series: each higher kind of living 
beings has a set of capacities that differentiates it from the lower kinds while also possessing all the 
lower capacities. The lower capacities, when possessed by the higher order beings, are not vestigial 
(as nature does nothing in vain). They remain necessary for the functioning of the living being that 
has them and, in fact, are necessary for the functioning of the higher capacities (DA 2.3, 414b29-
415a12). Consequently, they are present in an appropriately modified form so as to become 
integrated with, and supportive of those higher capacities.28  
 
27 For a discussion of this issue, see Witt 2012 and Stavrianeas 2018. 
28 For a philosophical defense of what might be taken to be the contrary view, namely that even in human 
beings the lower perceptual capacities are constitutively independent of rational capacities, see Burge 2010. It 
is not entirely clear that Burge’s view is in fact contrary to Aristotle’s since Aristotle does not hold that 
human perception is dependent on rational or conceptual capacities (which is the kind of thesis that Burge 
counters) but, rather, that its function and cooperation with rational capacities in a living being necessitates 
appropriate modification. 
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 This can be illustrated by the case of the nutritive soul in plants and animals. On Aristotle’s 
view, plants have only the nutritive capacity, but animals have both the nutritive and the perceptual 
capacity. Insofar as plants’ nutritive requirements are concerned, it is sufficient for them to take in 
nourishment as it is already concocted in (and by) the earth by their roots. Hence, they have no need 
for digestive track, producing no food waste (PA 2.3, 650a21-5 and 2.10, 655b32-5). The more 
complex animal bodies however require more heat (i.e. more than plants) in order to maintain their 
appropriate functioning (GA 2.1, 732a32-b12; PA 4.10, 686b21-687a1).29 Since vital heat comes 
from food (Spir. 473a3-14), animals need different (more potent) sources of food than plants, 
namely suitable organic ingredients (i.e. other animals or plants) which they locate and identify 
through perception. These ingredients must then be converted (through a process of digestion) to 
the kind of thing (i.e. food in the sense of the final product of digestion) that they can use for 
nourishment. In this way, they produce heat that is appropriate to maintain their functioning as 
animals (PA 3.10, 672b14-19).  
 Despite the differences just described, the nutritive capacity in both plants and animals 
fulfills the same function (DA 2.4, 416a20-1) and so can be characterized by the same general 
definition as ‘a power such as to maintain its possessor as such’ (DA 2.4, 416b18-19). Nevertheless, 
since animal nutritional requirements differ from those of plants, their nutritive capacity is quite 
different too. For example, it involves the presence of the digestive track and it is integrated with 
sensory organs that locate and identify the appropriate sources of food. In view of this ‘teleological 
nesting’30 of the soul’s capacities, it seems reasonable to suppose that the presence of the capacity 
for thinking, in addition to nutritive and perceptual capacities, will necessitate appropriate 
modification of the lower perceptual capacity as this must be appropriately integrated with the 
capacity for thinking so as to enable and support its functioning. Since desires (or, at any rate, non-
rational desires) are tied to the perceptual capacity (DA 3.7, 431a11-14), it is also reasonable to 
suppose that they too are modified in a way that is appropriate for their (teleological) subordination 
to the capacity for thinking. 
 But although this much is clear, it is not clear why the addition of the capacity to think 
should result in human desires becoming prone to deviation from what is natural and good for 
 
29 On this issue, see Freudenthal 1995, 58-68. 
30 ‘Teleological nesting’ is a term coined for Aristotle’s ‘serial’ analysis of the soul by Corcilius 2015, 42. See 
also Evans 2011.  
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human beings.31 If one thinks of cognitive and conative capacities as tied to the continuing 
successful survival and optimal functioning of a given animal (i.e. to its natural needs), then one 
might suppose that this is so independently of the complexity or the kind of those capacities, that is, 
independently of whether the cognitive capacities are rational or non-rational. Hence, even if one 
supposes that human perceptual capacities differ from animal ones insofar as they need to be 
appropriately integrated with the human capacity to think, one need not thereby also suppose that 
such modification necessitates any change in the basic framework in which those capacities operate, 
that is, in their connection to (human) natural needs.  
 The primary goal of the paper is thus to identify the crucial moment in which (or the crucial 
reason why) human desires become (or are) separated from human natural needs. Several issues 
complicate the task. First, Aristotle distinguishes three different kinds of human thinking – 
productive, practical and theoretical (e.g. Meta. 6.1, 1025b25-6) – each having a different and 
distinct form and purpose. Hence, in order to find an answer we need to examine each kind of 
thinking and its connection to desires and natural needs. The problem is that in order to do so, we 
need to consider the requirements that each kind of thinking imposes on human nature that (unlike 
the nature of a fully developed actual human being) does not yet exhibit PEI. Otherwise we would 
not be in any position to identify PEI’s cause. Second, there is a textual problem: there is no 
particular passage (or passages) in which Aristotle raises or addresses PEI in a sufficiently explicit 
way, nor is there a particular, manageable and appropriately related set of passages that, once 
connected by a hypothesis about how they are to be interpreted together, could give us an answer.  
 A skeptical reader might feel that, at this point, one should give up. Although it is possible 
to raise PEI in relation to Aristotle’s views, there does not seem to be an obvious interpretative 
move to answer it. Moreover, it might seem that even if one were to find an answer, it would be at 
 
31 Many scholars subscribe to the view that human non-rational cognition and desires are different from 
animal cognition and desires and that the difference has to do with the presence of intellect. However, when it 
comes to specifying what that difference is, it is not uncommon that they stay at the level of general 
statements to the effect that reason (conceptually) informs perception. For example, Eve Rabinoff says that 
‘human perception is informed by intellect (nous) … by situating perception within a non-perspectival 
framework’ (2015, 298). By this she means that we can see one and the same object as fulfilling many 
different functions or roles that we can conceptually articulate. As she says: ‘when I see a tree I see it as a 
tree, but I also see it as a shade-giver, or a jungle gym for children, or paper, or a fruit-bearer, or an object of 
inquiry’ (305). But this does not tell us anything about human perception’s distinctness from animal 
perception. It does capture the fact that human beings apply concepts to their perceptual experience. But such 
application might well be the work of intellect as it relates to perception, leaving perception as such 
unaffected. Rabinoff’s thesis is thus compatible with human perception being just like animal perception, the 
difference being simply that we use intellect to make further or more nuanced sense of what we perceive.  
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best an Aristotelian answer but not Aristotle’s. However, I would like to persuade the reader that we 
can work out an answer on Aristotle’s behalf and can do so by a combination of a particular 
philosophical method combined with standard exegesis of textual evidence. The result might be an 
answer that is indeed more Aristotelian than Aristotle’s (in the sense that it is not an answer he 
explicitly gives), but that is nevertheless philosophically and historically illuminating. As I will 
argue, the solution can shed considerable light on the way in which Aristotle (and those in antiquity 
who shared his assumptions about rationality) conceived of human nature. It can also offer an 
account of the cause of evil (or, at any rate, of ethical or moral deviations) that is significantly 
different from the usual ways of locating the cause of human evil in either free will or 
embodiment.32 
 Now Aristotle not only distinguishes three different kinds of reasoning but also maintains 
that these three kinds of reasoning stand in certain relations to one another: productive thought is 
ruled by practical thought (NE 6.2, 1139b1-6), and practical thought is, in turn, subordinate to 
theoretical thought insofar as it issues commands for its sake (NE 6.13, 1145a6-11). Given 
Aristotle’s thesis about the hierarchical relationship between the three kinds of reasoning and his 
general thesis about the ‘teleological nesting’ of the soul’s capacities, we can adopt a variation of a 
method that Paul Grice called ‘creature construction’ (Grice 1974-75, 36). The idea is to construct a 
sequence of kinds of human being by additions of different types of thinking in the hierarchical 
order suggested by Aristotle (productive, practical, and theoretical). The basis for construction 
(Section 3 below) is a condition in which a human being, if one like that were to exist, would be a 
non-rational animal. I call this (incomplete) kind of being Homo Animalis.33 This basis serves to 
identify the principal connection between cognitive and conative capacities and natural needs as 
those relate to the continuing successful survival and optimal functioning of a human being 
 
32 Free will for example in Augustine, Confessions 7.3.5. Embodiment as an answer can be found in Plato’s 
Timaeus, according to which the origin of evil is in the disorderly motions brought about by matter (i.e. it is 
the result of soul becoming embodied). This allows for the presence of bad or depraved desires since at least 
some of the motions (which include passions) are not directed at any particular good. On Plato’s account of 
the emergence of non-rational desires as a necessary result of the soul’s embodiment in the Timaeus, see 
Carpenter 2008 and Johansen 2008, 137-59. See also Vlastos 1939 who initiated much scholarly discussion of 
this cosmological tradition. There is also a theory suggested in the Laws 10 and the Phaedrus according to 
which the source of evil is pleonexia originating in (the non-rational element) in the soul. This view was made 
subject of scholarship by von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1919. For more recent discussions, some of which 
try to bridge the two traditions by bringing into considerations also passages from the Statesman and the 
Philebus, see Nightingale 1996; Carone 2005; Wood 2009; Dixsaut 2013, 201-16.  
33 Homo Animalis is Heidegger’s term for human being when thought of as ‘one being among others’ (Letter 
on ‘Humanism’ 155). I am not using the term quite in the way Heidegger did. 
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conceived of as yet lacking reason. In constructing further kinds of human being, our task will be to 
observe whether the addition of reason (in any one of its forms) requires a principal modification of 
this connection.34  
 In Section 4, I construct a human being (Homo Faber) who in addition to non-rational 
cognition (i.e. perception) possesses productive rationality whose purpose is to enable human 
beings to survive and function. As I argue, the possession of only the capacity for productive 
thinking leads to deficiencies that violate Aristotle’s dictum that ‘nature does nothing in vain’ 
(NIV). These deficiencies necessitate the addition of both practical rationality and theoretical 
rationality. In Section 5, I construct a human being (Homo Prudens) who possesses both productive 
and practical rationality. As we will see, Homo Prudens is also deficient in ways that violate NIV 
and so requires the addition of theoretical rationality. In Section 6, I go on to discuss Homo Sapiens 
who possesses all three kinds of rationality. As I argue, the addition of theoretical thought not only 
completes human beings as animals capable of survival and optimal functioning (without violating 
NIV) but also necessitates principal modification to our perceptual faculty and, ultimately, causes 
our desires to decouple from our natural needs. In section 7, I then offer my solution to PEI. 
 
3. Homo Animalis 
Non-rational animals are living beings that employ perception to keep themselves alive and 
procreating (DA 2.3, 414a31-3). They need perception since, unlike plants, which take already 
 
34 There is a remarkable (though not entirely parallel) ancient precedent for the procedure in Cicero, De 
Finibus 4.38 and 5.40. In his account of Antiochus’ views on ethical development and happiness, Cicero 
imagines that a vine, whose well-being is first cared for by a vine-keeper, acquires first sensation and, in the 
next step, also human mind. As he argues, the addition would preserve the lower functions, integrating them 
with the new ones and the plant would start caring for the well-being of the new whole (rather than just either 
for the old, original parts or only the new ones): ‘But imagine that the vine acquired senses, and so a degree of 
desire and self-motion. What do you think it would do then? Surely it would seek by its own endeavours to 
procure for itself the same results that had previously been sought by the vine-keeper? But notice that now it 
would have also acquired a sense to protect its senses and the capacity to desire that they afford, as well as 
any other organs it may have developed. So, in adding these new features to those it already had, the vine 
would not have exactly the same objective as the vine-keeper did. It would want to live in accordance with its 
newly acquired nature. Hence its highest good will be similar to what it was before, but not the same. It will 
be seeking not the good of a plant but the good of an animal. Now what if it had not only be given senses but 
also human mind (animus hominis)? It must be the case that its original features would still be there, in need 
of care. But these later additions will be of far more value, and most valuable of all will the finest components 
of its mind. In fully realizing this aspect of its nature, it will attain its end, its supreme good. After all, intellect 
and reason are by far the outstanding elements. Let this represent the limit of all that is desirable. Starting 
from an initial natural affection, we have ascended many steps to reach the summit, the combination of full 
bodily integrity with the perfection of reason’ (De Finibus 5.40, trans. R. Woolf). Thanks to Naly Thaler for 
the reference. 
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concocted nourishment from the earth by their roots (PA 2.3, 650a21-5), they need to engage in 
locomotion in order to find nourishment and partners to reproduce (e.g. DA 3.12, 434b1-8).35 
Perception provides animals with the recognition of items relevant to their nutritive and 
reproductive needs and, in turn, motivates them to pursue or avoid them depending on whether they 
are perceived in a pleasant or painful way (De Sensu 436b13-437a4). It is thus a cognitive power 
that is by its nature tied to the animal’s needs. In fact, as Aristotle tells us, the life of all non-rational 
animals is entirely focused on those needs (HA 8.1, 589a3-5):36 
 
(B) The life of animals, then, may be divided into two parts, procreation and feeding; for on 
these two all their efforts and life concentrate.  
 
 Since Aristotle places nourishment and reproduction at the center of non-rational animals’ 
lives, is he committed to saying that these activities are what makes their lives worthwhile? 
Although he does not address the issue explicitly, his theory does not imply such commitment. The 
highest and best ergon (i.e. function or distinctively characteristic activity) of non-rational animals 
is perception (DA 2.2, 413a25-b2; 2.3, 414b1-4; Somn. 2, 455b23-5; NE 9.9, 1170a16). If perfect 
performance of one’s ergon makes life good, then non-rational animals do not live worthwhile lives 
if they merely grow and reproduce (as plants do), or even simply perceive. Rather, their lives must 
aim at and (regularly) achieve perfected perceptual activities of the appropriate sort for the kind of 
living beings that they are. This means achieving perceptual pleasure that arises from engaging in 
the appropriate (for a given animal kind) activities of procreation and nourishment, in particular 
tactile and gustatory pleasure.37 
 
35 Although stationary animals (such as polyps or sponges) do not engage in locomotion, they nevertheless 
engage in movements or behaviors (such as extending the tentacles or contracting the body) that are related to 
their survival and nourishment and that can be explained only by tactile perception of something in a pleasant 
or painful way. 
36 See also GA 1.4, 717a21-2. 
37 This conception of animal well-being is compatible with Aristotle’s startling and controversial claim that 
most (if not all) plants and animals are, ultimately, for the sake of human beings (Pol. 1.8, 1256b6-26). One 
can hold that human beings are the apex users of the natural world while at the same time also holding that 
they should not diminish the well-being of other living things beyond what is necessary and natural. After all, 
if human beings were to systematically prevent the full actualization of other biological forms, they would 
render the perfect arrangements of nature vain. Such uses of living beings would be unnecessary and 
unnatural, and Aristotle describes them in precisely in those terms. For a discussion, see Johnson 2005, 229-
37. 
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 In order for animal perception to fulfill its function, animals need (1) to reliably form 
appropriate desires on the basis of what they perceive and (2) to have the appropriate means or 
instruments for obtaining what they desire. Concerning (2), Aristotle takes great care to show that 
non-rational animals not only have those instrumental parts that are necessary for them in order to 
survive and reproduce (DA 3.9, 432b21-6), but that they have them in such a way that these 
instruments are perfectly suited for those animals that have them for precisely the purposes that they 
need them. Thus non-rational animals are equipped with instruments that are, insofar as their 
abilities are concerned, the best for the purposes of their survival and reproduction (PA 661b27-32): 
 
(C) A general principle must be proclaimed, which will be useful not only in this case but 
also in many others that will be discussed later. Nature gives each organic part, both 
offensive and defensive, either alone to those that can use it or more to those who can use it 
more, and most to those who can use it best, whether it be a sting, or a spur, or horns, or 
tusks, or anything of that sort. 
 
But mere possession of the right sorts of instrument would not enable animals to survive and 
reproduce. They also need to be capable of finding, recognizing and pursuing what they need. 
Hence, if non-rational animals are to successfully live and procreate, they need to be so constituted 
that they find pleasant just those things that are good for them, that is those things promote and 
support their life-functions, including growth and reproduction. If that were not so then, given that 
they are not cognitively capable of determining what is good for them on any other grounds than the 
feelings of pleasure and pain, there would be no guarantee that they could survive and procreate.38 
That is why Aristotle tells us that ‘what is according to nature is to every animal agreeable 
 
38 In DA 3.3, Aristotle states that ‘to be deceived’ (ἠπατῆσθαι) is a state that ‘belongs more to animals and 
their soul continues in it longer’ (427b1-2). This statement has been thought to be problematic. If one 
translates τὸ ἠπατῆσθαι as ‘being in error’, one might immediately worry that Aristotle means that animal 
cognition errs more often than it gets things right. As Victor Caston points out, if this were true, it would 
make animals badly adapted to survival (1996, 27 n. 20), contrary to what Aristotle says elsewhere. Caston 
suggests that we tweak the translation so as to avoid the comparative sense. In that case, Aristotle would be 
saying that error is ‘particularly endemic to animals’, which is (perhaps) an easier statement to fit into 
Aristotle’s philosophy. But we can preserve the comparative if we understand Aristotle as saying that animals 
are more liable to being deceived than human beings since their cognition is less adaptive and so less able to 
compensate for errors. For example, if their natural environment is invaded by something foreign or artificial 
to it, they can be easily fooled into thinking that it is food on the basis of, say, visual similarity to their actual 
food. Moreover, many species of animals will not be able to correct themselves to avoid the new item, even if 
it is harmful to them. An example could be sea turtles who often mistake plastic bags for food (since they 
resemble jelly fish when floating in water) and regularly (fatally) injure themselves when trying to digest it. 
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(προσφιλές)’ (HA 7.2, 590a10-11) and that all non-rational animals pursue pleasure in accordance 
with their nature (HA 7.1, 589a8-9). 
 Let us, then, imagine a human being of this sort, a Homo Animalis. Homo Animalis would 
be guided by tactile or gustatory pleasure and pain to desire what is (actually) good for her. The 
things that would be good for her would be precisely those things that would optimally support her 
life-functions, including nutrition, reproduction, perception and locomotion (DA 2.4, 416b17-19). 
Her capacity for perception would be (just like in the case of all other non-rational animals) tied to 
her needs – it would single out and focus on those features of things that are relevant for identifying 
what would satisfy her needs and desires. The problem is that Homo Animalis is an incomplete (and 
in fact impossible) being. As Aristotle reminds us, human bodies are purposefully arranged so as to 
best support thinking rather than perceptual activities (PA 4.10, 686a25-b28) and that requires 
modifications to the body that preclude most direct ways of food acquisition.39 In particular, they 
lack instruments (such as claws, trunks or beaks) that would be suitable for direct acquisition of the 
things they need. Thus even as her perception reliably identifies the relevant items and she reliably 
forms desires for them, Homo Animalis lacks the kind of bodily instruments that would enable her 
to obtain them in a way that would not endanger her life. And since Homo Animalis also does not 
yet have reason (for which her body has been modified) which would (as we will shortly see) 
remedy the issue, Homo Animalis would not survive. 
 
4. Homo Faber 
Instead of possessing instruments for direct acquisition of food (like non-rational animals), human 
beings have hands which are ‘instruments for instruments’ (ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων) (PA 4.10, 
687a21). Hands are, on Aristotle’s view, the perfect complement to reason. Being ‘the most 
variously serviceable of all instruments’ (687a22-3), they allow human beings to construct just 
about anything that they want once they have acquired knowledge or craft of how to do so. As 
Aristotle remarks, the eponymous character in Plato’s Protagoras was wrong to say that human 
beings are not ‘put together well’ (συνέστηκεν οὐ καλῶς) even if they are indeed ‘barefooted, naked 
and without a weapon to defend themselves’ (PA 4.10, 687a25-6).40 Although non-rational animals 
are equipped with instruments that they need, they can neither vary them according to changing 
 
39 For a discussion of Aristotle’s views about human posture, see Gregorić 2005 and Thein 2017, 85-94. 
40 That Aristotle is referring to Protagoras’ myth is clear from the language since in Plato’s dialogue 
Protagoras describes human beings as ‘naked, barefooted, with no bed and arms’ (γυµνόν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητον 
καὶ ἄστρωτον καὶ ἄοπλον) (Prot. 321c). 
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situations nor lay them aside when they do not need them. As Aristotle says, they have to do 
everything, including sleeping, ‘with their sandals on’ (PA 4.10, 687a28-9). In contrast, human 
beings only have ‘instrument for instruments’, and so they not only can, but in fact must vary them 
by situation and in doing so are incomparably more versatile than any animal: ‘For the hand 
becomes talon, hoof and horn, as well as spear and sword, and any other weapon or instrument’ (PA 
4.10, 687a31-b4). 
 At its most basic level, then, reason (more than) compensates for the lack of natural 
instruments by allowing human beings to use hands to produce whatever instruments they need in 
order to survive and maintain their functioning. Aristotle’s name for the kind of thought that is 
aimed at fulfilling this function is productive (ποιητική) thinking. It is primarily concerned with 
devising ways of producing things that are advantageous (συµφέροντα), beneficial (ὠφέλιµα), or 
useful (ἔχειν χρῆσιν) in view of our needs (χρεῖαι) (Meta. 1.2, 982b11-28). In its perfected state, it 
takes the form of craft which Aristotle describes as a ‘state involving true account (λόγος) 
concerned with production’ (NE 6.4, 1140a10). As he tells us, if human beings were not ‘the most 
capable of acquiring crafts’ (PA 4.10, 687a22), they would have to rely on luck (NE 6.4, 1140a17) 
to provide them with the instruments (or directly the things) they need.41 Productive thinking is 
there to ensure the human survival without relying on something as fickle as luck. An important 
feature of productive thinking, as Aristotle conceives of it, is its independence from the desires and 
beliefs of the person who engages in it. Although one must have some reasons in order to think 
about how to produce or construct something, insofar as the production of that thing is concerned, 
those reasons play no role. Rather, it is the product itself (i.e. its relevant features) that determines 
how it can (or must) be constructed or produced. At least ideally, productive thinking thus proceeds 
through hypothetical necessity: if A is to be made, then, given what A is, B must be done (e.g. 
Meta. 7.7, 1032ab7-11).  
 Two related consequences follow from this conception of productive thinking.42 First, its 
results (i.e. recipes how to produce something) are universal (Meta. 1.1, 918a13-22) – they are 
useful and applicable for anyone who wishes to produce the relevant products and is capable of 
 
41 This is, presumably, how most animals that use instruments operate – they use as instrument things that 
they happen to find nearby the place they need them. But they do not prepare the instruments in advance or 
keep them for further use. See also n. 48 below. 
42 I defend the conception of productive thinking briefly described and assumed in this section (and of 
practical thinking in the next section) in Müller 2019. 
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following the instructions about how to do so. Crafts, as both Plato and Aristotle like to remind us,43 
are teachable because they are bodies of universal knowledge. Second, productive knowledge (or 
craft) is motivationally inert (Meta. 9.5, 1048a11).44 As Aristotle conceives of it, productive 
thinking contemplates the form of contingent things that lack internal nature from the point of view 
of their construction or coming to be (NE 6.4, 1140a11-15) and so also their destruction or passing 
away (Meta. 9.2, 1146b8-9; NE 5.1, 1129a16-25).45 Hence, it is thinking (and from it resulting 
knowledge or beliefs) that can be put to use in more than one way. As Aristotle makes clear in Met. 
9.2, this is the mark of rational (µετὰ λόγου) psychological powers. Unlike non-rational powers that 
are ‘of one thing’ (µία ἑνός), rational ones (i.e. crafts) are ‘of opposites (τῶν ἐναντίων)’ (Meta. 9.2, 
1046b5-6). A non-rational power works always the same way, producing the same result. 
Consequently, whenever it is in appropriate circumstances, it will be activated and produce the 
result for which it is a power. A rational power, however, is productive of contrary effects and so it 
cannot be activated, as such, merely by external circumstances. If it were, it would produce 
incompatible results at the same time and that is not possible (Met. 9.5, 1048a8-11). There must 
thus be something that gives productive thinking (and so also production) a direction – whether it is 
to operate towards construction of its product or away from an already constructed product towards 
its destruction. As Aristotle says, there must be something sets it to such outcome in the particular 
circumstances: ‘That which directs (τὸ κύριον), then, must be something else; I mean by this desire 
or decision (ὄρεξιν ἢ προαίρεσιν)’ (Met. 9.5, 1048a11-2).  
 Let us then imagine Homo Faber:46 a human being in whom productive thinking is the sole 
way in which reason operates in conjunction with perception. Since Homo Faber is Homo Animalis 
plus the (motivationally inert) capacity for productive thinking, the ‘desire or decision’ that would 
give her productive thought direction can only be one that was motivating also Homo Animalis, 
namely non-rational desire for pleasure and aversion to pain. But, unlike Homo Animalis, Homo 
 
43 For Plato, see, for example: Lach. 185b-d; Gorg. 514c-d; or Prot. 319b-c. For Aristotle, see Mets. 981b7-
a30. 
44 But see Johansen 2017. 
45 In this respect, productive thought is similar to the study of coming to be and passing away of natural things 
– the study of the life-cycle of, say, lions involves the causes of both birth and growth into a healthy 
individual as well as of sickness, decay and death. As a kind of knowledge, craft thus grants the power to both 
produce and destroy. 
46 I borrow the term from Henri Bergson. However, although Homo Faber in the sense used here is akin to 
Bergson’s idea insofar as she possesses ‘la faculté de fabriquer les objets artificiels’, she is also different 
insofar as she is not yet assumed to be capable ‘d'en varier indéfiniment la fabrication’ (Bergson 2013, 138).  
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Faber would use reason to construct various useful instruments and to devise clever ways to satisfy 
her needs. We could even say what good life for Homo Faber would consists in since we know 
what her ergon would be, namely ideal exercise for her distinctive capacity, productive thinking. 
Hence, a good life for her would have to aim at and achieve perfected intellectual activity of the 
right sort, namely the exercise of craft in obtaining and satisfying her needs in the best (i.e. the most 
pleasant) way.  
 Does the addition of productive thinking to Homo Animalis necessitate any principal 
modification to the connection between the cognitive and conative capacities (or to the capacities 
themselves) as they relate to Homo Faber’s needs, that is to her continuing survival and optimal 
functioning? Homo Faber needs to devise instruments, and in order to do so she needs to operate 
with conceptions or insights that are relevant to their construction. For example, in order to make 
bread, she must know how to obtain flour and how, having mixed it with water into dough, she can 
produce bread by heating the dough. In order to gain the appropriate insights and knowledge, her 
cognitive powers must provide her with the right information. For example, concerning fire, she 
needs to know how to safely use it as a source of heat. She thus needs more complex information 
and more cognitive power than Homo Animalis. Nevertheless, there is nothing inconsistent in 
supposing that Homo Faber’s cognitive and conative powers remain tied to her natural needs, that 
is, in supposing that she finds pleasant and so forms desires for just those things that are good and 
healthy for her and that her cognition provides her with information that is relevant to obtaining the 
things that satisfy those desires. Consequently, there is no reason to suppose that she would (or 
must) form desires that would not be tied to her needs (setting aside cases in which she would be 
externally induced to do so) and so no reason to change the basic framework within which her 
cognitive and conative powers operate.  
 And yet there is a fundamental problem with Homo Faber conceived of in this way. Let us 
imagine that Productikus is a Homo Faber, someone who can only engage in productive thinking.47 
Being hungry, he wanders through the forest in search of prey and sees a deer. Since he perceives it 
 
47 It is possible that Aristotle conceives of ‘natural slaves’ in a similar way. They are unlike animals since 
they can apprehend or perceive (αἰσθάνεσθαι) reason (Pol. 1.5, 1254b23) and they can also clearly master 
(when appropriately instructed) various branches of knowledge about how to make things and execute tasks 
(Pol. 1.7, 1255b21-35). But Aristotle denies them practical thinking since he denies them foresight (Pol. 1.2, 
1252a32) and the ability to deliberate (Pol. 1.13, 1260a14). Nevertheless, ‘natural slaves’ are unlike Homo 
Faber since they can and often do form desires that are bad for them if they were not ruled by their masters. 
As far as the argument in this paper is concerned, then, ‘natural slaves’ must have more rationality that 
Aristotle appears to grant them. 
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as something that could satisfy his hunger, he desires to catch and eat it. But lacking any immediate 
means to do so, he must first go and make a bow and an arrow (in order to kill the deer) and a knife 
to help him make the deer into a meal. The problem is that Productikus will go hungry because by 
the time he manages to produce these instruments, the deer has had more than ample time to run 
away. It would again be simply a matter of luck if he were able to find and catch another deer. 
Obviously, then, Productikus needs to make the required instruments beforehand and have them at 
hand for when the right opportunity comes by. Moreover, he should keep them beyond the first use 
so that he does not have to make them again.48 In other words, if productive thinking is to be 
effective (and not violate NIV) and Productikus not dependent on luck,49 he also needs foresight 
and long-term planning.50 Having foresight and engaging in long-term planning require, minimally, 
 
48 There are animals who use instruments without foresight since they neither prepare them in advance nor 
keep them for later (repeated) use. Jane Goodall describes complex tool-making behavior of chimpanzees that 
involves modifying (often with preferences for different modifications or material) sticks to catch termites. 
They sometimes even carry the sticks for a distance when inspecting different termite nests (Goodall 1968, 
204-11). However, chimpanzees neither manufacture sticks in advance (at a time when they have no 
immediate need for them), nor keep the sticks long-term for repeated future use. Similarly, New Caledonian 
crows exhibit complex tool manufacturing skills but they do not keep their tools for future use. They however 
do afford their juveniles access to discarded tools for apparently learning purposes (see Holzhaider, Hunt and 
Gray 2010). Interestingly, sea otters are exceptional insofar as they anticipate future needs and keep tools for 
those anticipated occasions (see Hall and Schaller 1964).  
49 One might think that animals rely on luck in the sense that, for example, it is a matter of chance whether a 
lion encounters its prey at a given waterhole and even if she does, whether she will catch it. But this is not 
quite right. First, it would be a matter of luck (given Aristotle’s view of luck in the Physics) if the lion went to 
the waterhole to drink rather than to satisfy its hunger but, being also hungry, happened to find a suitable deer 
there. However, lions generally stalk their prey precisely in places where the prey is likely to be. Second, 
lions pursue specifically those animals that they are in the best position to catch (sick, elderly or young). 
Third, their method of killing the prey is tied to the kinds of instruments (claws, teeth) that they have: they try 
and generally manage to break its neck or suffocate it rather than, for example, cause blunt trauma. The point 
is that insofar as the animal’s (in this case lion’s) objectives are concerned, its cognitive and conative 
capacities, and its natural hunting instruments (sharp teeth, claws etc.) mitigate the animal’s reliance on luck 
to such an extent that the explanation of the animal’s successful actions refers to those capacities and 
instruments rather than to luck. Accordingly, Homo Faber’s limited ability to use productive reasoning fails 
to mitigate her reliance on luck precisely because when and if she succeeds, this remains due luck. For 
example, it would be a matter of luck that she would find the right materials to construct a needed instrument 
sufficiently quickly (say, a spear) precisely when and where she would need it (i.e. that having found a prey, 
she would also happen to find the right materials). In this sense, she would be worse off than a non-rational 
animal that always already comes prepared for hunt. 
50 One could object that productive thinking already requires the ability to plan (since its products are, in fact, 
plans of construction) and so such ability and productive thinking are not really distinct. However, what is at 
stake is not the ability to produce a plan in the sense of a sequence of steps of construction (such as recipe), 
but the ability to plan according to foresight concerning one’s own current and future situations. Planning of 
this sort – one that includes deciding when and what to produce and for what purpose is not the task of 
productive thinking as such (even as such ability is required for it to be effective). Insofar as we are trying to 
identify what, if any, modifications of Homo Animalis’ non-rational conative and associated cognitive 
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a developed sense of time that includes past and future (DA 3.10, 433b7-10), the ability to retrieve 
memories at will (HA 1.1, 488b25-6), and recognition of oneself as having desires that are not 
currently felt. I will address this problem (P1) in the next section. 
 
5. Homo Prudens 
It was too late for Homo Faber to start thinking about getting the right instruments for hunting at 
the moment she found her prey. In fact, it would be too late to start thinking about it when she 
started to feel hunger. If she is to do better and overcome her dependence on luck, she must be 
capable of regulating her productive activities according to a long-term plan and independently of 
such currently felt desires. One possibility would be to act according to a plan how to attain a 
specific, particular goal, say a deer, and constructing the requisite instruments for that particular 
occasion. For example, she could construct the requisite instruments on day 1 and then use them to 
catch a deer on day 2. But this would be an inefficient (i.e. NIV-violating) use of her ability to plan 
with foresight, one that would depend on luck to an unacceptable degree. After all, she might not 
encounter any deer on day 2 and even if she manages to catch one, she will later need to hunt again 
and so would need to construct the instruments again. It seems, then, that if planning and foresight 
are to be put to an efficient use, the agent needs to operate with, and according to, general, long-
term goals.  
 This is the task of practical thinking – it is thinking that involves planning with a view to 
the future (NE 6.2, 1139b7; Rhet. 1.3, 1358b8-15) so as to reliably achieve and sustain long-term, 
general goals.51 It does so, at least partially, by regulating one’s use of productive thinking and 
activities (NE 6.2, 1139a36). As productive thought is concerned with producing things that are 
useful (as instruments) for obtaining, attaining or performing things that satisfy our needs or desires, 
so practical thought is concerned with things (i.e. activities or objects) that are useful or beneficial 
for promoting one’s desired goals (or ends). The goals, typically long-term and general, can be 
either specific ones, such as health or adequate food supply, or the overall goal of the agent’s well-
being. In the latter case, practical thinking is concerned with what is ‘good and beneficial to the 
agent himself’ or with what will ‘promote living well in general’ (NE 6.5, 1140a25-9). On a societal 
scale, this means regulating which crafts are studied and used (NE 1.2, 1094b1-5) within the city-
 
capacities are necessitated by the addition of productive thinking as such, importing the ability to plan 
according to foresight into the picture at this point would prevent the identification. 
51 It is sometimes suggested that Aristotle’s theory of practical thinking lacks appropriate resources to 
accommodate planning with a view to the future. For a discussion, see Sherman 1985. 
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state. On an individual level, it means, among other things, planning – in view of one’s current and 
anticipated needs – what, when, and how to produce and make use of. I will give the name Homo 
Prudens to the kind of human being who, in addition to the abilities and capacities of Homo Faber, 
is also capable of practical reasoning. 
 If practical thinking is to regulate the agent’s actions based on considerations of long-term 
goals it must be capable of (1) operating independently of the agent’s immediate, non-rational 
desires as well as (2) exerting control over such desires. Concerning (1), consider the case of 
Productikus – he cannot wait till he feels hunger to plan his food supply. He needs to plan quite 
independently of any feeling of hunger and, in fact, especially when he is not feeling hunger. But 
(2) is no less crucial. In thinking practically, the agent needs to be able to compare and evaluate her 
different goals and needs, and decide which of them are to be prioritized now and which are to be 
taken care of later. This activity inevitably gives rise to conflicts between what she feels she needs 
or desires now and what she thinks or believes she will need or desire in the future. For example, 
satisfying her hunger now might endanger her ability to satisfy her long-term desire for a steady 
supply of food.  
 If Homo Prudens is, then, to profit from rational calculation, she needs to be able to 
regulate and control her immediate desires.52 This can be put paradoxically: our (practical) rational 
nature demands that for the sake of the overall better satisfaction of our non-rational desires, we 
often suppress those very desires.53 Hence a human being who in addition to perception and 
productive thought engages in practical thinking must be capable of a form of motivation that is 
independent of perceptual pleasure and pain and that operates with conceptual articulations of one’s 
non-rational desires that it needs to regulate. Aristotle calls this motivational source, sensitive to 
 
52 It is no coincidence that in Xenophon’s Memorabilia, self-control (enkrateia) is the basis of all virtue, 
something without which one could not ‘learn anything good or practice anything worthwhile’ (Memorabilia 
1.5.4-5). It is also one of the hallmarks of Socrates who was, as Xenophon puts it, ‘so self-controlled that he 
never chose the pleasanter rather than the better’ (ἐγκρατὴς δὲ ὥστε µηδέποτε προαιρεῖσθαι τὸ ἥδιον ἀντὶ τοῦ 
βελτίονος, Mem. 4.7.11, 8-9). On Socrates in this connection, see Devereux 1995. It is remarkable how close, 
in this respect, contemporary psychology tracks Ancient philosophy: ‘The capacity of the human self to 
override its initial responses is one of the most important, powerful, and adaptive aspects of human nature. 
The immense flexibility and variety of human behavior can be directly attributed to people’s ability to alter 
their responses – the essence of self-regulation. In many species, response follows directly from the stimulus 
and flows along well-programmed, highly regular and predictable patterns. Humans too are animals and have 
many of these innately prepared or well-learned responses. Yet humans can often prevent themselves from 
responding in these ways if the make the effort to override their initial response’ (Baumeister and Vohs 2003, 
201).  
53 In saying this, I am not committing myself to any particular way in which such suppression is supposed to 
work. For a critical discussion of the issue, see Corcilius 2008, 160-207. 
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calculation of time (DA 3.10, 433b5-11), wish (βούλησις). As he tells us, wish belongs to the 
calculating part of the soul (DA 3.10, 432b5-6) and it is aroused by thinking or judging that 
something is good (NE 3.4, 1113a23-7) rather than by perceiving something in a pleasant way.  
Insofar as Homo Prudens is concerned, however, there is an important qualification to be kept in 
mind. Her practical reason can only be conceived of as investigating what is good or best to do 
(from a long term perspective) in relation to the kinds of concerns that we assumed motivated 
Homo Faber. This is because, in the context of Homo Prudens, practical reason’s primary purpose 
(i.e. the reason why it was added to Homo Faber) is to make optimal use of her productive abilities 
in view of her natural needs. Accordingly, although Homo Prudens is able to form desires (wishes) 
that are sensitive to rational calculation and to the judgments of goodness, the goodness at which 
those wishes are aimed must be understood instrumentally, that is, as conduciveness to the same 
(ultimate) goal that animated Homo Faber, namely pleasure. It is within this framework that we 
need to consider the addition of practical thinking to Homo Faber. Does it necessitate any principal 
modification to the connection between the cognitive and conative capacities, or to the capacities 
themselves? In particular does it require that Homo Prudens’ non-rational desires (that is, desires 
for what she finds pleasant and aversions to what she finds painful) become untied from her natural 
needs (i.e. from things that are good and healthy for her)?  
 In order to answer the question we need to consider the way in which Homo Prudens 
engages in practical reasoning. Recall that for Homo Faber the impetus to think or do anything was 
provided by a currently felt pleasure-based desire, presumably one that was felt by her as the most 
urgent. Since her thinking and actions were directly dependent on her feelings, this put severe 
limitations on her ability to make use of productive thinking. Home Prudens is supposed to avoid 
this problem by being able to focus her mind on certain wishes (and so initiate her thinking about 
what to do) independently of any immediate non-rational desire. Aristotle outlines two ways in 
which an agent can come to think of a particular long-term wished-for goal. Though distinct, they 
share a common feature, namely that there is some one goal (or one standing concern) that is 
always, in one way or another, being engaged. The agent uses this goal as an organizing principle of 
her thoughts – what she ends up thinking about is, ultimately, decided by her consideration 
(however brief or implicit) of what matters most (or what should be prioritized) in view of her 
pursuit of that goal.  
 The first way is one that Aristotle is keen on reminding us to avoid as a great folly (EE 2.2, 
1214b10). The agent does not choose her organizing principle (or overarching goal) by any 
reflection on her life as a whole and what would make it worthwhile. Rather, she elevates to that 
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position whatever goal or concern appears to her to be the most pressing one in a given period of 
her life – and what appears to her to be most pressing concern is determined by her feelings of 
pleasure and pain (NE 1.5, 1095b14-20). This is the case of the many (οἱ πολλοί) (NE 1.4, 1095a22-
5): 
 
(D) For the many think that [eudaimonia] is something palpable and obvious, like pleasure or 
wealth or honor, while others think it still something else. In fact, even the same person often 
changes his view: for having fallen sick he thinks it is health, but having fallen into poverty 
he thinks it is wealth.  
 
 Although Aristotle does not explicitly explain why it is a great folly to be or to act this way, 
the reason is not hard to guess – it severely restricts the extent to which practical reason can succeed 
in providing for the overall well-being of the agent. One may succeed in some partial endeavor (say, 
in taking care of one’s health), but one might well do so at the expense of any other goals one has, 
either making them harder to reach or even undermining the possibility of reaching them altogether. 
As the quote suggests, a person who operates in this way would pursue healthy life-style only when 
they are sick. But, of course, this would mean that, once healthy, she could easily slip back into 
unhealthy living and end up sick again. Moreover some ends require long-term concerted effort and 
dedication, and so can appear, after some time, more burdensome than attractive. An agent 
operating in this way would be better off than Homo Faber but only marginally so. Even if she 
plans according to long-term goals, she would often not find it attractive to stick to them since she 
would frequently change her views about which long-term goals matter. Moreover, there is no 
guarantee that, from a long-term perspective, the goal she is currently using as her organizing 
principle is in fact the one she should be using. Hence, if Homo Prudens were to operate in this 
way, she could only succeed in her endeavors as a matter of luck rather than as a matter of her 
effective use of practical thinking. 
 It is no surprise, then, that Aristotle outlines another way for organizing one’s thoughts and 
actions, one in which one consciously postulates a particular, stable goal as the organizing principle. 
As he says (EE 1.2, 1214b7-9):  
 
(E) Everyone that is able to live according to his own decision should set up for himself a 
goal for living finely (whether honor or reputation or wealth or education) with reference to 
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which he will then conduct all his actions, since not to have one’s life organized in view of 
some end is a mark of great foolishness.  
 
 The idea, then, would be that Homo Prudens would organize her life so as to maximize her 
overall satisfaction or pleasure in view of her anticipated natural needs and relevant desires. In other 
words, pleasure would not only be Homo Prudens’ ultimate goal or source of motivation (i.e. the 
final explanation of her actions) but also her consciously adopted, general overarching goal, around 
which she would organize her life. We could, then, conceive of Homo Prudens’ practical thinking 
in terms of what psychologists call ‘temporal discounting’ – essentially, the calculus of pleasure in 
Plato’s Protagoras. The idea is that in deciding among alternative courses of action, one calculates 
the amount of pleasure for each course and does so irrespectively of the time at which the pleasure 
occurs (thus countering the tendency to overestimate pleasure at hand and underestimate future 
pleasure) and chooses the more pleasant course. Accordingly, Homo Prudens would use practical 
thinking or deliberation to devise plans so as to achieve optimal, long-term satisfaction of her needs 
and desires.  
 Does the operation of practical reason so conceived require that Homo Prudens’ non-
rational desires become untied from her natural needs? There are two points that might lead one to 
think so. First, Homo Prudens operates with an abstract conception of pleasure. Second, she will 
have conflicts between her short-term (or occurrent) desires and long-term plans and wishes (which 
will require suppression of the short-term ones). But neither of these points is decisive. Concerning 
the first, it seems perfectly coherent to think that the goal of Homo Prudens is maximization of the 
kind of pleasures for which she has non-rational desires and to the extent to which she desires (and 
anticipates desiring) them. It might be that she could think of a way to increase them further than 
she feels a need for them but there is no reason to suppose that the fact that she can think that means 
that she will also form a corresponding (excessive) non-rational desire. After all, the same holds of 
human beings in general – there are many things or activities that we find pleasant and can think of 
how we could maximize but we do not thereby also (non-rationally) desire to do so. Of course, we 
(i.e. full-fledged human beings) do so in some cases. But that means that the explanation cannot be 
the mere fact that we operate with an abstract conception of pleasure. Concerning the second point, 
the conflicts between short-term desires and long-term plans need not be understood as conflicts 
between bad or excessive desires of the moment and good long-term ones. Rather, sometimes one’s 
occurrent desires, appropriate as they might be at the time, need to be suppressed in view of one’s 
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anticipated future needs. It would be good if one satisfied one’s desire now, but it will be better 
overall if one postpones the satisfaction. 
 If the foregoing discussion is along the right lines, Homo Prudens might seem to embody a 
certain ideal type of human being. She has healthy desires that correspond to her natural needs and 
she plans her life and productive activities so as to achieve best possible satisfaction of those desires 
and needs. If we were to imagine the life a community of such Homines Prudentes, we would 
imagine the life of citizens in Plato’s First City.54 As Socrates describes the city, it is not only 
complete, but also true and healthy (372e) since it satisfies all of its inhabitants’ necessary needs 
(373a) (which means, as we learn later at 558d-559c, that it satisfies appetites that are by nature 
necessary).55 The city manages to satisfy all those desires because it is filled with craftsmen 
(τεχνῖται) who produce things that are useful for the satisfaction of the basic, natural needs and do 
so in a way that enables the citizens to sustain their lives from a long-term perspective.  
 It is a well-known fact that Socrates is forced to abandon his first city. His interlocutors not 
only cannot recognize how justice and injustice are present in it (or if they are present at all),56 but 
also insist that the First City is not really a city worthy of human life. As they see it, it should be 
properly called a City of Pigs (ὑῶν πόλις) rather than of people. Although people in this city live 
good lives since they live in peace and good health (ἐν εἰρήνῃ µετὰ ὑγιείας),57 their lives, focused as 
they are on the basic physical needs for nourishment and reproduction (and the pleasures associated 
with them) are only fit for animals. Socrates thus must move to a city which does not have only 
what is necessary and natural but also what is established by convention (νοµίζεται) (372d). This 
new city is then filled not only with craftsmen who produce things useful for the satisfaction of the 
basic, natural needs, but also with all sorts of ‘makers’ (δηµιουργοί). These makers produce things 
that Socrates deems unnecessary (373b) since, as we also learn later, they are neither necessary for 
living, nor beneficial for living well (559a-b). Rather, they feed appetites that Socrates sees, 
 
54 ‘First City’ is Aristotle’s term of choice for the City of Pigs (Pol. 1291a17). It might have ironic overtones 
as the phrase πρώτη πόλις usually means ‘a leading city’, whether in a geographic area or in an area of human 
activity.  
55 On this point, see Annas 1980, 77; Reeve 1988, 176-7; and Cooper 2004a, 257-9. 
56 On this point, see McDavid 2019. 
57 For a view that the City of Pigs is in fact Plato’s Ideal City, see, for example, Silverman 2007. Although 
one need not agree with Silverman’s conclusion, Socrates’ reluctance to extend the development of the city 
beyond the first stage is significant, especially in view of his later insistence that the virtuous person should 
not have (or minimize) appetites for the kind of pleasures that are added to pleasures found in the First City 
(Rep. 558d-559b and 571e-572d). 
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correspondingly, as unnecessary (558d-9a). Unsurprisingly, Socrates describes this new city as 
unhealthy, inflamed (φλεγµαίνουσα) and luxurious (τρυφῶσα). 
 Although one might wonder why Plato thought that the First City needed to be 
abandoned,58 our question concerning Homo Prudens is more specific: is practical thinking, as 
conceived so far, in a position to deliver on its promise? There are at least two reasons for thinking 
that it is not. First, as Aristotle tells us, ‘pleasures differ in form (τῷ εἴδει)’ (NE 10.3, 1173b27; 
10.5, 1175a22) according to the kinds of activity in relation to which they arise.59 They differ in fact 
so much that they can come to impede each other: pleasure derived from one kind of activity acts as 
pain in relation to another kind of activity (NE 10.5, 1175b1-23).60 The problem is that if pleasure is 
to serve as the ultimate goal (or measure of goodness) for Homo Prudens, then pleasures must be 
commensurable. Although they certainly are so in some cases (e.g. when Odysseus considers 
whether it would be more satisfactory to exact revenge now or later), on Aristotle’s account they 
cannot be so in general. For example, there does not seem to be a way to usefully compare (in terms 
of potential pleasure gains) the outcomes of securing future food supply through farming vs. 
training for victory in next year’s chess competition vs. relaxing with a glass of wine.61 Second, the 
 
58 It is remarkable that what made the luxurious city of revelers suitable for (or worthy of) human life was the 
addition of unnecessary appetites and of the (equally) unnecessary and, on Plato’s view, unhealthy and 
harmful objects that satisfy them. On this picture, it would appear that human beings cannot have only desires 
that are natural, that is, good and healthy for them (at least not if they are to live human lives). Perhaps more 
precisely, it would appear that it is not possible for human beings to have healthy and good desires without 
the extraordinary measures (as Socrates portrays them in the Republic) that a society, as well as individual 
human beings, must take to impose control on those appetites so as to become and remain good and virtuous. 
And even when these extraordinary measures are in place, only few individuals can reach the full and true 
virtuous state in which their desires are healthy, natural, and good while the rest of the society needs to be 
constrained and managed by laws and punishments imposed on it by the virtuous minority of philosopher-
kings. The First City is thus not only unfit for human beings but also psychologically unrealistic – human 
appetites, as Socrates (and Thrasymachus: see Cooper 2004a, 248) tells us, are prone to grow beyond what is 
good and necessary, exhibiting constant tendency to lawlessness, excess and savagery (e.g. Rep. 572b and 
588c-d) and there is nothing in the First City – no system of laws and punishments (as noted already by 
Aristotle at Pol. 1290b21-1291b13 – to guarantee that they do not. As Rachel Barney puts it, the First City 
‘embodies the hypothesis that a city without rational rule could be moderate in its appetites’ but such 
hypothesis is false (2001, 220).  
59 See also NE 1.8, 1099a11-15; 7.12, 1153a1-7. 
60 Although this concerns especially the various interactions between the two distinct branches of pleasure – 
pleasures associated with perceptual activities and those associated with intellectual activities (NE 10.5, 
1176a1-5), the same holds of kinds of pleasures within each branch.  
61 Scholars often maintain that Aristotle is committed to the principle of weak commensurability, that is, to 
the idea that if practical reasoning involves comparison of alternatives, then it can only be successful if ‘there 
is a common factor shared by the alternatives in terms of which they may be compared’ (Charles 1984, 111). 
But the case of Homo Prudens considers (and at this stage can only consider) a stronger position, one in 
which pleasure presents the common measure in which any two or more options can be compared. Given the 
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range of pleasures that one can experience is limited by one’s own capacities and character: ‘the 
same things delight some people and give pain to others and while to some they are painful and 
hateful to others they are pleasant and loveable’ (NE 10.5, 1176a9-12). Although some future 
pleasures or pains can perhaps be foreseen (say, if one is to enjoy playing soccer in the afternoon, 
one cannot eat too much for lunch), any long-term estimates are subject to changes that are either 
very difficult or impossible to foresee (such as possible changes in one’s physical health, in one’s 
mental capacities, or in one’s political situation).  
 The diversity and fluidity of the forms of pleasure thus make it an unlikely candidate to 
allow an effective decision procedure.62 The problem is rooted in the very function of pleasure. As 
we have seen, pleasure is nature’s way of guiding animals, through perception, to what is currently 
good for them – what they find pleasant changes in accordance with the changes in their physical 
and psychological conditions and external circumstances. The diversity and fluidity of pleasure is 
thus essential to its being a useful guide from short-term perspective. But it severely constraints its 
usefulness as a principle or guide from a long-term (or even life-long) perspective. If Homo 
Prudens were to use pleasure as the criterion by which to organize the pursuit of her long-term, 
general goals (and so organize her life), she would not be able to do so precisely on account of that 
very diversity and fluidity. Even if she tried to determine which of the many sorts of pleasure would 
have the best chances to serve as her stable overarching goal, the dependence of what one finds 
pleasant on one’s particular circumstances would make such long-term determination impossible.63 
Even the seemingly most reliable sources of pleasure do not provide the desired stability.64  
 
variety and incommensurability of different kinds of pleasure, there is no guarantee that even the principles of 
weak commensurability could be sustained.  
62 Although Plato entertains pleasure as such a single, unified measure or criterion in the Protagoras, it is 
well-known that he leaves it behind once its nature is subjected to examination (e.g. Rep. 580d-7b; Phileb. 
12d-e). For a useful discussion of the problem in Plato’s thought, see the classic studies by Crombie 1962, 
225-68; and Nussbaum 1986, 106-16. 
63 One could wonder whether the virtuous person could be guided by pleasure since she is ‘lover of the fine’ 
and what pleases her (namely, virtuous actions) is ‘pleasant by nature’ and so not ‘in conflict’ (NE 1.8, 
1099a11-15). But Aristotle thinks that the virtuous person is an excellent judge of what is truly pleasant 
because she possesses a criterion of goodness that is other than pleasure and that enables her to not be swayed 
by the mere appearance of pleasure as the many (NE 3.4, 1113a29-34). This is not to deny that the virtuous 
person’s feelings are not a better guide to action that other people’s feelings. However, Aristotle certainly 
does not think that the virtuous person should (or even could) rely on them rather than on her reason to guide 
her life. For example, he certainly does not hold that virtuous actions are always pleasant or that the virtuous 
person finds pleasant only such actions.  
64 This is the famous lesson of the opening pages of Rep. 1 in which Cephalus enumerates the various benefits 
of wealth (330d-1e) as providing a stable, secure foundation for a good or content life only to be, as a 
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 The problem, then, is not that pleasure is an unreliable guide to what is good – for animals, 
it serves its purpose perfectly well. The problem is that it is not a suitable guide to thinking about 
what is good for oneself from a long-term perspective. Despite initial appearances, Homo Prudens 
is not in a good position to use her practical reasoning to manage and organize her long-term goals 
so as to live well. The effectiveness of her practical thinking would be, once again, dependent on 
luck and so, in this respect, NIV violating. But it would be quite absurd if nature were to provide 
human beings with a capacity for practical thinking without enabling them to operate with a suitable 
criterion of goodness. Thus, although the addition of practical reason solved one problem (P1), it 
raised a new one. If Homo Prudens is to follow Aristotle’s advice and ‘set up for herself a goal for 
living finely’ but if she cannot use pleasure to ‘save her life’ (Prot. 357a), she requires a source of 
motivation that is different from pleasure, one that would provide her with a criterion of (or guide 
to) goodness that is suitable for long-term thinking and planning and that will, at the same time, 
bear just the right relation to what is good for her (in particular, that will reflect her knowledge of 
what is good, as opposed to her perception of what is pleasant).  
 Perhaps one might think that some other (i.e. other than pleasure) conceptual articulation of 
one’s basic needs or non-rational desires would do, for example wealth, health, safety, power, honor 
or reputation. The problem with this suggestion is that some things are good for us even if they do 
not contribute to, or even appear harmful in view of, goals of this sort. For example, it is sometimes 
good to preserve one’s honor even if doing so harms one’s health, or to increase one’s power even 
if it harms one’s reputation. So Homo Prudens would need a criterion according to which she would 
choose which one of them to pursue and when. This could be pleasure but, as we have seen, 
pleasure as is unsuitable for the task. Alternatively, she could simply stick to one such goal at all 
costs. But doing so would be arbitrary and irrational since one’s circumstances can render a goal of 
that sort bad or harmful, either at the moment or from a long-term perspective. What Homo Prudens 
requires, if she is to use her practical thinking for its purpose, is a true and reliable guide to (or 
criterion of) goodness (one that would help her decide which of the long-term goals is to be pursued 
now and which later), not simply a guide that might bear no connection to what is good for her. If 
pleasure has been thought to be (at least so far) a reliable guide to what is good from a short-term or 
immediate perspective, goals such wealth, health, safety and so on are not suited for guidance from 
even such short-term perspective, much less from long-term one. Homo Prudens thus needs a 
 
contemporary reader would know, ruined by bad luck – that is, by a change in the political situation in Athens 
(on this, see the discussion in Annas 1981, 18-21). 
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different kind of criterion, one that is not any of the natural goals or ends that we have encountered 
so far. To any attentive reader of Aristotle the identity of this other source of motivation is no 
mystery – it is what Aristotle calls τὸ καλόν (the beautiful or the fine).  
 
6. Homo Sapiens 
When we spelled out the workings of productive and practical thought, we concentrated on features 
or modes of thinking that were useful for satisfying our natural needs and desires (i.e. reproductive 
and nutritive needs). In doing so, we did not conceive of reason as doing anything on its own, as 
having any interest or sphere of activity independently of such needs. Rather, human natural needs 
were assumed to be already in place before we even constructed the first human being endowed 
with reason, Homo Faber. Reason, in its two forms discussed so far, was conceived of as an 
instrumental faculty aimed at efficient satisfaction of those needs. But the various problems we 
encountered show that reason so conceived is not well-positioned to do what we thought it was 
supposed to do even insofar as those needs and desires are concerned. It would appear, then, that the 
solution lies in conceiving of reason as doing something on its own, as having its own sphere of 
interest and activity that stands apart from our natural needs and desires.65 
 Insofar as Aristotle is concerned, there is little mystery as to what reason (on its own) seeks 
– it is, as he tells us, truth (NE 6.2, 1139a23-31). In particular, thinking as such, that is, theoretical 
thinking, seeks truth in the form of understanding provided by scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήµη). The 
basic contours of what this means for Aristotle are well known. To have scientific knowledge is to 
have the ability to explain things (or facts) in terms of causes. We explain things scientifically by 
showing or demonstrating how they deductively follow from first principles. The grasp of such 
(syllogistic) deduction just is what having the truth about a given fact or thing is. Aristotle has a 
great deal to tell us about how reason can arrive at such truths, in particular about how it can 
construct the kind of explanations it seeks by finding the right explanatory factor of a given thesis 
or claim (for example, that planets do not flicker is explained by their being close) (APo. 1.13). 
 Since Aristotle holds a (more or less) empiricist theory of knowledge according to which all 
knowledge must start with sense perception and experience,66 it follows that, in order to be able to 
 
65 Some scholars believe that, perhaps unlike Plato, Aristotle came to think of reason as ‘neutral instrument 
that can be used well or badly, rather than one whose natural tendency is in the direction of wisdom’ (Sorabji 
1995, 70-1). Sorabji’s claim relies, at least partially, on a mistaken understanding of the nature of cleverness 
(δεινότης) in NE 6.13. I discuss the issue of cleverness in Müller 2018, 163-6. 
66 Besides Meta. 1.1 and APo. 2.19, see esp. APo. 1.18, 81a38-b9. 
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satisfy their desire to know, human beings must be capable of acquiring perceptual experience that 
is not tied to their needs of survival and reproduction but, rather, derived from perceiving or 
observing things independently of any such needs. This feature of human perceptual capacity 
constitutes a major difference between human beings and other animals whose perceptual systems 
are firmly tied to their natural needs. Aristotle helpfully gives us a picture of what would happen, 
from the point of view of acquisition of knowledge, if human cognition were confined only to those 
features of things that are useful for basic needs of nourishment and survival. As he portrays it (in 
Meta. 1.1 and APo. 2.19), both animals and human beings have the ability to recognize repeatable 
patterns in their perceptual experience (although they do so in varying degrees of complexity). For 
example, they can become able to reliably distinguish rabbits from other (often similar) animals; to 
identify things as being of the same color; or to recognize that things that smell or look certain way 
are not to be eaten. The structured sum of such patterns forms what Aristotle calls experience 
(ἐµπειρία). In the case of animals, experience is aimed at allowing them to navigate the world. It 
enables them to reliably identify what they should avoid and what they should pursue. From this 
point of view, experience is a set of memories that are structured on the basis of relevant (for one’s 
purposes) similarities. For example, it will tell the animal that things of certain size, color and shape 
that behave in a certain way are to be pursued.  
 Now if human beings were just like other animals, the acquisition of their experience could 
be aimed at and constrained by the purpose of enabling them to navigate the world as they seek to 
satisfy their (natural) needs. Although their ability to gain and employ experience would be greatly 
enhanced by the fact that they can operate with concepts and formulate general thoughts (such as 
‘light meats are healthy’) and rules (such as ‘when having a headache, take a red pill’), the 
difference would be a matter of degree rather than of kind. As Aristotle explicitly says, human 
beings could (and in fact do) succeed in navigating the world in this way, that is, simply on the 
basis of experience (Meta. 981a13-15). In order to know what things are, however, it is not enough 
to have experience that can identify things in relation to one’s needs. It is entirely conceivable that 
the features by which one identifies things in the experience-only based way have nothing to do 
with what the things themselves are. For example, the fact that one should eat things that are sweet 
and smell nice, does not necessarily reveal anything about what those things are or even about what 
makes them beneficial (Met. 1.1, 981a7-13): 
 
(F) For to have a supposition that when Callias was sick of this disease this benefitted him, 
and so also to Socrates and so in many individual cases, is a matter of experience. But to 
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suppose that it benefitted all people of a certain kind, marked off according to one form, 
when they were sick of this disease (for example, to phlegmatic or bilious people when 
burning with fever), is a matter of craft. 
 
According to this passage, a person of mere experience can formulate a number of propositions, 
such as ‘treatment T helped Callias when he had fever’. She can, on the basis of these propositions, 
also form a rule: ‘If people have a fever, apply treatment T.’ An experience-based rule of this sort 
provides a quick, reliable and clear guidance to one’s actions. But such experience might offer no 
insight into what the disease in question is (and so, in this case, into why the particular treatment is 
effective). Experience as tied to our natural (non-rational) needs provides little or no basis for 
developing knowledge (unless accidentally). 
 In animals, as well as in Homo Faber and Homo Prudens, the link between cognition and 
needs was provided by feelings of pleasure and pain which provided guidance and motivation to 
pursue things that were relevant to satisfying those needs. But the needs of Homo Sapiens are not 
exhausted by the natural needs of survival and procreation. They also include the desire to know. 
Since, as we have just seen, that desire cannot be satisfied if her cognition remains tied to her 
natural (i.e. procreative and nutritive) needs, that link needs to be modified. And indeed, on 
Aristotle’s view, it is a peculiar feature of human beings that they can find pleasure in perceptual 
acts themselves, independently of the perceived object’s relation to their basic nutritive needs (Met. 
1.1, 980a22-7), whereas non-rational animals do not take pleasure in things or activities that are not 
linked to, or are independent from, their reproductive and nutritive needs (NE 3.10, 1118a19-24; De 
Sensu 443b20-444a5). 
 The reason why human beings find such things pleasant is precisely the fact that they by 
nature desire to know. The fact that human beings can find pleasure in perceptual acts themselves, 
independently of the perceived object’s relation to their basic nutritive needs (Meta. 1.1, 980a22-7) 
is connected to their ability to acquire experience that is relevant to acquisition knowledge. The 
pleasure that human beings find in perceiving things in this ‘disinterested’ way provides motivation 
to sustain the relevant perception, and focuses, or, as Aristotle puts it at NE 1175a3, ‘enhances’, the 
cognitive activity itself. This concerns especially sensory modalities that operate through external 
media: seeing, hearing and smelling. In non-rational animals, these three senses are a means of 
33 
 
preservation (σωτηρία) of life by guiding the animals towards food and away from danger.67 In 
human beings, however, they also communicate to the mind many distinctive qualities (διαφοραί) 
of things from which comes knowledge or understanding of both theoretical and practical things 
(De Sensu 436b21-437a3).68 Insofar as their contribution to knowledge is concerned, Aristotle 
singles out especially seeing and hearing. On the one hand, as he tells us, it is through sight that we 
most come to know things (Meta. 1.1, 980a26-8) insofar as through it we recognize the form 
(µορφή) of things (Top. 2.7, 113a31-2). Presumably, this is because it is by sight that we best 
perceive the common sensibles, such figure, magnitude, motion or number (De Sensu 437a8-10). 
On the other hand, hearing makes a crucial contribution to knowledge since it enables us to use and 
communicate through speech and discourse which are indispensable for learning (De Sensu 437a10-
15). 
 However, human beings need to be able to focus on not just any such features of things but 
precisely on those that make or account for what things are. This means that they need to be able to 
focus on those features that account for the teleological order that things exhibit, that is, for their 
being so ordered as to form functional unities. It is such teleological ordering that makes things 
what they are.69 It is, then, not just any sights and sounds that human beings (are supposed to) enjoy 
but those that are related to what things are, that is, those that are related to things’ being 
functionally well-ordered unities.70 But the sensitivity to features related to teleological ordering of 
things is nothing else but sensitivity to beauty: we find those things beautiful that exhibit order, 
symmetry or definiteness (Meta. 13.3, 1078a31-b5) and these features are exhibited by those very 
things that are functionally well-ordered unities.71 The sensitivity to things insofar as they are kala 
 
67 Consequently, non-rational animals enjoy them insofar as they are indicative of current or potential 
nutritive or sexual activity. Moreover, as Aristotle makes clear at De Sensu 443b20-444a5, non-rational 
animals are entirely incapable of enjoying sights, smells or sounds that are not connected (even potentially) to 
reproductive or nutritional activities. 
68 Thus although Aristotle attributes to many non-rational animals variety of characteristics that suggest 
complex forms of cognition (including qualities like sensitivity, intelligence, skillfulness, industriousness or 
political nature), the continuity with human intellectual abilities, including phronesis, should not be 
overemphasized, as Aristotle himself warns us at NE 6.7, 1141a22-8. But see Labarrière 1990. 
69 On the connections between nature, essence, unity, and teleological order, see Phys. 8.1, 252a11-16; De 
Caelo 3.2, 301a5-12; and Meta. 4.2, 1003b23-1004a9. On the connection between essence (nature) and 
function (ergon) see, for example, Meteor. 4.12. 
70 See, for example, PA 1.5, 645a21-6; Pol. 3.12, 1284b8-22; or 7.4, 1326a33 ff. 
71 There is little doubt that Aristotle connects functional or effective teleological order (that is, structural 
arrangement of things that conduces to their good or proper end) with beauty. For a discussion of this point 
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(or insofar as they exhibit such features) is a peculiarly human feature (EE 3.2, 1230b21-30; NE 
10.8, 1178b32-4) – it requires the ability to focus on features of things that are not tied to 
reproductive or nutritive needs and so the ability to enjoy perceptual acts of seeing, hearing, and 
smelling in themselves.72 
 We thus arrive at a teleological explanation of human beings’ sensitivity to beauty – the 
very human desire for knowledge and understanding requires that human perception supplies it with 
the right sort of information. It is because of this requirement that we are sensitive to things insofar 
as they are beautiful. If pleasure is the way in which nature reveals to each organism what is good 
for it, beauty is the way in which nature reveals itself to the inquiring observer (Meta. 1.1, 984b12; 
5.1, 1013a22). But if human perception is sensitive to beauty, that is, if human beings find 
perceptual pleasure in contemplating things, then it must be the case that human non-rational 
(perception-based) desires for things insofar as those things are pleasant are also sensitive to things 
in this way. And that means that human beings experience as pleasant, and so form non-rational 
desires for, things that are not tied to their survival, that is, either to their nutritive or reproductive 
needs.  
 
7. PEI 
We have identified the crucial moment in which human (non-rational) desires become detached 
from human natural needs. Although this was the primary task of the paper, there is more work to 
be done if we are to address PEI. In particular, we still need an explanation of the unlimited nature 
of human non-rational desires and of their inherent tendency to excess. As we shall see, although 
the explanation is conventional, ultimately lying in the identification of goodness with pleasure, we 
are now in a better position to see its implications. We can begin by observing that human beings do 
not form different kinds of non-rational desire for things insofar as they are, on the one hand, 
pleasant in view of their nutritive and reproductive needs and, on the other hand, pleasant because 
 
see Richardson Lear 2006. There is also little doubt that Aristotle thinks that essences of things exhibit 
precisely such teleological order and, hence, beauty (e.g. Meta. 1.3, 984b12-18). 
72 In the Philebus, Plato identifies as true pleasures those that arise from sights, sounds, odors and knowledge 
(51b-52a). In the case of sights and sounds, he says that they arise from those that are beautiful by nature (or 
in themselves) (51b-c). Although he classifies as true also pleasures that arise from odors (under certain 
conditions, i.e. when not preceded by pain), he refrains from saying that they arise from beautiful odors (51d). 
Aristotle, however, has no such qualms when he identifies certain odors, such as those of flowers, as beautiful 
(EE 3.2, 1231a12-13) since they are intrinsically pleasant (rather than pleasant in relation to anticipated 
nutrition). But neither Plato nor Aristotle ever speaks of beauty in relation taste (or flavor) and touch. 
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they strike them as beautiful (or otherwise attractive independently of the nutritive and reproductive 
needs).73 This suggests an inherent tension in the way in which human non-rational desires are 
supposed to work. On the one hand, they are supposed to serve nutritive and reproductive (i.e. 
natural) needs and from that point of view there is (or should be) a natural limit to them, determined 
by what is healthy and beneficial. This concerns both bodily pleasures in which the right measure is 
given by health and beneficence (NE 3.11, 1119a15-18), as well as those pleasures that arise from 
things like victory, honor or wealth (NE 7.4, 1147b24-1148a4) in which the right measure is given 
by their usefulness or beneficial contribution to life (Pol. 1.8, 1256b26-34).  
 On the other hand, human perceptual, and so also desiderative, capacities must 
appropriately serve and supply information to the higher, intellectual faculty. But since ‘everything 
is a possible object of thought’ (DA 3.4, 429a18) and the desire to know extends to all of nature 
since ‘in every natural thing there is something to wonder about’ (PA 1.5, 645a16-17), human 
beings must be capable of finding it pleasant to perceive any possible object of knowledge (i.e. any 
teleologically or functionally – whether actually or potentially – arranged unity). For example, 
Aristotle tells us that ‘there is something natural and so beautiful’ in all animals (PA 1.5, 645a22-3) 
even if, presumably, not all animals are of interest to human beings as sources of food. Furthermore, 
since a desire to know cannot be excessive (e.g. Pol. 7.1, 1323b7-12) and so has no natural limit, 
there also cannot be any such limit in relation to desiring what is beautiful (kalon). If there were, it 
would impose a limit on the desire to know. From the point of view of perception’s role vis-à-vis 
intellect, then, human non-rational desires cannot be constrained or limited, either by a built-in 
mechanism or adaptation to a particular habitat.74 
 Although this tension should be resolved in favor of the higher, intellectual function, it is 
not immediately obvious what it would mean for appetites to be unlimited in relation to bodily 
pleasures. In fact, it might be thought that the tension just outlined is ameliorated by the fact that 
bodily pleasures cannot be enjoyed beyond a certain measure or amount, namely up to the point of 
 
73 See, for example, Prob. 10.52, 896b10-38. 
74 For non-rational animals it is possible to specify their natural nutritive needs and ways of life. As Aristotle 
says, there are many sorts of food and so the lives of animals differ in kind, depending on the kind of food 
they require (Pol. 1.8, 1256a19-23). In general, they ‘live in the way which is beneficial for getting their food, 
accordingly as they are carnivorous or herbivorous or omnivorous: nature has determined their ways of life so 
as to make it easier for them to get hold of the required food. And since the same things are not naturally 
pleasant to each, but different things to different ones, the ways of life of carnivorous and herbivorous animals 
are different from one another’ (Pol. 1.8, 1256a24-9). 
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satisfying the relevant desire.75 And yet, as we have seen, Aristotle asserts that in pursuing bodily 
pleasures human beings are insatiable ‘since the nature of their appetite is unlimited’ (Pol. 2.7, 
1267b4). But we can now explain what Aristotle means by appetites being unlimited in relation to 
bodily pleasure. First, although Aristotle believes that human beings have an innate ability to 
(perceptually) enjoy beautiful things independently of their natural needs (such as hunger or sexual 
desire),76 they nevertheless first develop desires for pleasures associated with bodily needs, and 
especially those associated with satisfying hunger and thirst. Even later in life, these pleasures 
remain more conspicuous and intense than the ones associated with perception of things insofar as 
they are kala. They remains so because they are accompanied (or preceded) by pain, generally a 
bodily lack in need of replenishment (NE 7.14, 1154a22-b20). Second, since human beings are 
sensitive to beauty (and in general to formal features of well-formed things), their experience of 
bodily pleasures can be enhanced by its presence in things that constitute sources of such (bodily) 
pleasures (e.g. EE 3.2, 1230b21-1231a26; Prob. 10.52, 896b22-3).  
 As a result, there is a tendency to identify to kalon with that which either directly satisfies 
bodily desires, or is useful and contributes to their satisfaction. A mind that is focused on bodily 
pleasures (as that of all young people) is naturally liable to confuse beauty with things that are 
sources of (and resources for) non-rational pleasure.77 The consequences of this confusion are 
momentous, since the shaping of one’s sensibilities (i.e. one’s habituation) in relation to things that 
are kala (that is, the shaping of a sensibility that does not have any natural limit) is now driven by, 
and subordinate to, the enjoyment of the sort that pertains to non-rational needs (i.e. which are 
supposed to have a natural limit). In other words, the confusion of beauty with sources of bodily 
pleasure leads human non-rational desires to develop their unlimited nature (which is supposed to 
serve intellectual needs) towards bodily needs and desires. Aristotle offers a portrayal of the result 
of this confusion in his description of the rise of two particular objects of pursuit that correspond to 
the two kinds of non-rational desires he recognizes (appetite and spirit): wealth and honor. 
 In the case of appetite, this is the unnatural (e.g. Pol. 1.10, 1258b1) art or craft of the 
acquisition of wealth for its own sake (as opposed to instrumentally for the sake of things that are 
 
75 Probl. 10.47, 896a27-8; 21.13, 928a34-b22; 21.14, 928b23-929a5; 22.3, 930a24-38; 28.7, 950a14-15. 
76 The clearest example is music: Pol. 8.5, 1339b42-1340a5. 
77 Here it might be helpful to think, for example, of someone like Hippias in Hippias Major who seems 
completely unable to conceive of fineness or beauty in terms unrelated to his natural (pleasure-based) needs, 
identifying the fine with what is pleasant to perception (a beautiful girl at 287e) or useful for having a pleasant 
life overall (wealth at 291d-e). 
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necessary for life), which Aristotle portrays in Pol. 1.9-10. Wealth, originally an instrument to 
enable exchange of (useful) goods, becomes the object of appetitive desires even when, as Aristotle 
says, one can accumulate great wealth and yet ‘perish with hunger’ (Pol. 1.9, 1257b15-17). It is, in 
his view, the most absurd kind of goal since it leads to a state in which one starts to use one’s every 
faculty and power ‘in an unnatural way’ (1258a10). By that he means that one starts to organize 
one’s life so as to increase the amount of useless (or even harmful) wealth while, at the same time, 
failing to attend to one’s actual (natural and intellectual) needs. In the case of spirit, the situation is 
less absurd since what becomes the object of one’s desires (honor) is something which has 
connection to usefulness, since it is ‘the sign of good reputation for doing good’ (Rhet. 1.5, 
1361a28), where ‘doing good’ (εὐεργεσία) refers to one’s past or future beneficial contribution to 
preserving things of value (such as life). However, honor is still merely a token of recognition of 
one’s good and beneficial actions and not something to be desired as such.  
 Although it is the addition of sensitivity to beauty (necessitated by the addition of 
theoretical reason) that leads to desires for honor and wealth as intrinsic goods, this is not because 
honor and wealth themselves possess any beauty. Their value, such as it is, is merely instrumental.78 
But in Homo Sapiens, due to the severing of the link between natural needs and (non-rational) 
desires and so due to the removal of natural limits on appetite and spirit, they can become non-
instrumental objects of such desires (in the way described above). Of course, Aristotle thinks that 
those limits can be artificially imposed and so that one can avoid desiring wealth or honor as 
intrinsically good things. But this can be done only by a mind that is trained to discern and care 
about what is truly beautiful or fine (i.e. that is trained to care about knowledge of what is good) 
and distinguish it from (bodily) pleasure. For someone who lacks an appropriately discerning mind, 
however, wealth and honor remain particularly attractive as objects of pursuit. Although bodily 
pleasures cannot be enjoyed beyond certain measure or amount,79 there is no limit to how much 
wealth or honor one can acquire. Wealth and honor thus make a ‘perfect’ fit for (the unlimited) non-
rational desires of such a person. That is why Aristotle can say both (NE 3.4, 1113a30-b1):  
 
each state of character has its own view of what is fine and pleasant, and so perhaps the 
excellent person differs from others most in that he see the truth in each case, being as it were 
 
78 This is perhaps most clearly expressed in NE 1.5, 1095b23-30 (for honor) and 1.5, 1096a5-9 (for pleasure). 
79 See n. 75 above for references. 
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a standard or measure of them. For the many, however, pleasure is the cause of deception 
since it appears good [to them] when it is not; 
 
and also that the many ‘do not even have a notion of what is fine and truly pleasant since they have 
not tasted it’ (NE 10.9, 1179b15). 
 We have, then, arrived at the answer to PEI. Once reason was conceived of as a faculty in 
its own right, it imposed certain demands on human non-rational nature. These demands ultimately 
led to the removal of natural constraints on human non-rational desire and, hence, to their ‘limitless’ 
nature. The tendency to badness then follows as the result of the hard-to-resist confusion of 
goodness with pleasure. As Aristotle sees it, it is extraordinarily difficult to arrive at the proper 
notion of to kalon (at least for most people). And insofar as that is so, there is no limit to the 
erroneous ways in which they end up organizing their lives and, hence, their ways of life.80  
 PEI thus does not signal a flaw in otherwise perfect workings of nature. Rather, the addition 
of rationality to the underlying animal nature necessarily brings about a tendency of that animal 
nature to go astray. As Aristotle contends, if that part of our nature is to function appropriately, it 
can do so only in an appropriately artificially constructed environment of a polis which would 
impose those constraints and limits. Hence, Aristotle’s thesis that polis is both natural and, at the 
same time, artificial – it is the only environment (if constructed correctly) in which human beings 
can appropriately satisfy their natural needs and yet it is the product of the highest craft or art, that 
is, of political craft.81 Of course, it is not every polis that can do that. Unlike other social or political 
animals that invariably form appropriate communities for their particular ways of life (such as bees, 
wasps, or ants), most (if not all) societies formed by human beings fall short of their purpose.82 We 
have seen some reasons for these deviations in the inevitable, competing (and false) claims of honor 
and wealth to provide the organizing values for societies, leading to the various deviant forms of 
government, including oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. 
 I would like to close the paper with a brief note on our responsibility for having bad, 
unnatural or excessive desires. It might be thought that, if the account given so far is along the right 
 
80 Here it seems apt to quote Hegel’s classic remark: ‘Der Mensch erweitert durch seine Vorstellungen und 
Reflexionen seine Begierden, die kein beschlossener Kreis wie der Instinkt des Tieres sind, und führt sie in 
das schlecht Unendliche’ (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts §185: Zusatz).  
81 On the intricacies of this issue, see Pellegrin 2017b. 
82 On Aristotle’s notion of human being as a political animal, see Kullmann 1991 as well as Pellegrin 2017a, 
93-108. 
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lines, the proclivity for such desires is a necessary consequence of human psychological make-up 
(in particular, of the addition of rationality). And if it is a necessary consequence, it might be further 
thought that we cannot be held responsible for becoming vicious, contrary to what Aristotle says in 
NE 3.5. This is a difficult topic that I cannot treat here in a satisfactory manner.83 However, it is 
crucial to see that, even if human beings have an inherent tendency to form such desires, that fact, 
in Aristotle’s universe, does not translate into those desires (or, rather, their objects) being natural 
desires, that is, desires we are supposed to develop. On the contrary, in Aristotle’s universe we 
might be thought to have a task, insofar as development of virtue (or, rather, eudaimonia as a life 
achieved through the exercise of virtues) is our natural end or telos, to train and educate ourselves 
so as to avoid developing such desires. Aristotle can claim this because he believes there is such a 
thing as an objective, natural telos of human life. If there was no such thing, it would be difficult to 
see how we could be blamed for developing desires for which we have, as a matter of fact, an innate 
proclivity. In sum, it might be that it is very difficult and so rare to develop in the right way (i.e. to 
become virtuous), but the difficulty does not remove our responsibility to try, as best as we can, to 
do so (even as it might explain our failures). We certainly cannot be blamed for the tendency to 
develop bad desires, but we can be blamed for not countering that tendency.84  
 
Bibliography 
Annas, J. (1980). Aristotle on Pleasure and Goodness, In: A. O. Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle’s 
Ethics, Berkeley and Los Angeles, pp. 285-99. 
Annas, J. (1981). Introduction to Plato’s Republic. Oxford. 
Balme, D. M. (1987a). Teleology and Necessity. In: A. Gotthelf and J, G. Lennox, eds., 
Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology, Cambridge, pp. 275-85. 
Balme, D. M. (1987b). Aristotle’s Biology was not Essentialist. In: A. Gotthelf and J, G. Lennox, 
eds., Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology, Cambridge, pp. 291-312. 
Barney, R. (2001). Platonism, Moral Nostalgia, and the ‘City of Pigs’. Proceedings of the Boston 
Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 27, pp. 207-27. 
Barney, R. (2019). Becoming Bad: Aristotle on Vice and Moral Habituation. Oxford Studies in 
Ancient Philosophy 57 (forthcoming). 
 
83 But see Müller 2015a. 
84 I would like to thank Naly Thaler, Brennan McDavid and anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments 
on this paper. 
40 
 
Baumeister R. F., and K. D. Vohs (2003). Willpower, Choice, and Self-Control. In: G. 
Loewenstein, D. Read and R. F. Baumeister , eds., Time and Decision: Economic and 
Psychological Perspectives on Intertemporal Choice, New York, pp. 201-16.  
Beere, J. (2012). Doing and Being: An Interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Theta. Oxford. 
Bergson, H. (2013). L'évolution créatrice. Paris. 
Burge, T. (2010). Origins of Objectivity. Oxford.  
Carone, G. R. (2005). Plato’s Cosmology and its Ethical Dimensions. Cambridge. 
Carpenter, A. D. (2008). Embodying Intelligence: Animals and Us in Plato’s Timaeus. In: J. Zovko 
and J. Dillon, eds., Platonism and Forms of Intelligence, Berlin, pp. 39-58. 
Caston, V. (1996). Why Aristotle Needs Imagination. Phronesis 41, pp. 20-55. 
Charles, D. (1984). Aristotle’s Philosophy of Action. London.  
Cooper, J. M. (2004a). Two Theories of Justice. In: Cooper, Knowledge, Nature, and the Good: 
Essays on Ancient Philosophy, Princeton, pp. 247-69. 
Cooper, J. M. (2004b). Aristotle on Natural Teleology. In: Cooper, Knowledge, Nature, and the 
Good: Essays on Ancient Philosophy, Princeton, pp. 107-29. 
Corcilius, K. (2008). Streben und Bewegen: Aristoteles’ Theorie der animalischen Ortsbewegung. 
Berlin. 
Corcilius, K. (2015). Faculties in Ancient Philosophy. In: D. Perler, ed., The Faculties: A History. 
Oxford, pp. 19-58. 
Crombie, I. M. (1962). An Examination of Plato’s Doctrines. Vol. 1. London.  
de Sade, D. A. F. (1998a). La Philosophie dans le boudoir, ou Les Instituteurs immoraux. In: Sade: 
Œuvres, ed. M. Delon, Paris, pp 1-178. 
de Sade, D. A. F. (1998b). Juliette ou les prospérités du vice. In: Sade: Œuvres, ed. M. Delon, 
Paris, pp. 179-1262. 
Devereux, D. (1995). Socrates’ Kantian Conception of Virtue. The Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 33, pp. 381-408. 
Evans, D. (2011). Serial Analysis and the Unity of the Human Person. In: C. Rossitto, ed., La 
Psyhologie d’Aristote, Paris, pp. 45-56.  
Freudenthal, G. (1995). Aristotle’s Theory of Material Substance: Heat and Pneuma, Form and 
Soul. Oxford. 
Garrett, J. E. (1993). The Moral Status of ‘the Many’ in Aristotle. Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 31, pp. 171-91.  
41 
 
Gelber, J. (2015). Aristotle on Essence and Habitat. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 48, pp. 
267-93. 
Gregorić, P. (2005). Plato’s and Aristotle’s Explanation of Human Posture. Rhizai 2, pp. 183-96. 
Grice, P. (1974-75),. Method in Philosophical Psychology (From the Banal to the Bizarre). 
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 48, pp. 23-53. 
Goldin, O. (1993). Aristotle on Good and Bad Actualities. The Journal of Neoplatonic Studies 2, 
pp. 126-50. 
Goodall, J. (1968). The Behaviour of Free-living Chimpanzees in the Gombe Stream Reserve. 
London. 
Gottlieb, P. and E. Sober (2017). Aristotle on ‘Nature Does Nothing in Vain’. HOPOS: The Journal 
of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 7, pp. 246-71. 
Gould, T. (1971). The Metaphysical Foundations for Aristotle’s Ethics. In: J. P. Anton and G. L. 
Kustas, eds., Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, Albany, pp. 451-61.  
Güremen, R. and Jaulin, A. eds. (2017), Aristote, l'animal politique. Paris. 
Hall, K. R. L. and Schaller, G. B. (1964). Tool-Using Behavior of the California Sea Otter. Journal 
of Mammalogy 45, pp. 287-98. 
Henry, D. (2013). Optimality and Teleology in Aristotle’s Natural Science. Oxford Studies in 
Ancient Philosophy 45, pp. 225-64. 
Holzhaider, J. C., Hunt, G. R. and Gray, R. D. (2010). The Development of Pandanus Tool 
Manufacture in Wild New Caledonian Crows. Behaviour 147, pp. 553-86.  
Johansen, T. K. (2008). Plato’s Natural Philosophy: A Study of the Timaeus-Critias. Oxford.  
Johansen, T. K. (2017). Aristotle on the Logos of the Craftsman. Phronesis 62, pp. 97-135. 
Johnson, M. (2005). Aristotle on Teleology. Oxford. 
Kamtekar, R. (2018). Explaining Evil in Plato, Euripides, and Seneca. In: A. Chignell, ed., Evil: A 
History, Oxford, pp. 97-128. 
Katz, E. C. and Polansky, R. (2006). The Bad is Last But Does not Last: Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ 
9. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 31, pp. 233-42. 
Kontos, P. (2014). Non-Virtuous States in Aristotle’s Ethics. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 
47, pp. 205-43. 
Kontos, P., ed. (2018a). Evil in Aristotle. Cambridge.  
Kontos, P. (2018b). Radical Evil in Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics. In: Kontos 2018a, pp. 75-97. 
Kullmann, W. (1991). Man as a Political Animal in Aristotle. In: D. Keyt and F. D. Miller, Jr., eds., 
A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics, Oxford, pp. 94-117. 
42 
 
Labarrière, J.-L. (1990). De la phronèsis animale. In: in D. Devereux and P. Pellegrin, eds., 
Biologie, logique et métaphysique chez Aristote, Paris, pp. 405-28.  
Lennox, J. (2001). Nature Does Nothing in Vain. In: J. Lennox, ed., Aristotle's Philosophy of 
Biology: Studies in the Origins of Life Science, Cambridge, pp. 205-24. 
Lennox, J. (2010). Bios and Explanatory Unity in Aristotle’s Biology. In: D. Charles, ed., Definition 
in Greek Philosophy, Oxford, pp. 329-55. 
Leunissen, M. (2010). Aristotle’s Science of Nature. Cambridge. 
Leunissen, M. (2011). ‘Crafting Natures’: Aristotle on Animal Design. Philosophic Exchange 41, 
pp. 2-25. 
McDavid, B. (2019). On Why the City of Pigs and Clocks Are Not Just. Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 57, pp. 571-94. 
Müller, J. (2015a). Agency and Responsibility in Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics. Phronesis 60, pp. 
205-51. 
Müller, J. (2015b). Aristotle on Vice. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23, pp. 459-77. 
Müller, J. (2018). Practical and Productive Thinking in Aristotle. Phronesis 63, pp. 148-75. 
Nightingale, A. W. (1996). Plato on the Origins of Evil: The Statesman Myth Reconsidered. 
Ancient Philosophy 16, pp. 65-91. 
Nielsen, K. M. (2017). Vice in the Nicomachean Ethics. Phronesis 62, pp. 1-25 
Nussbaum, M. (1986) The Fragility of Goodness. Cambridge. 
Pearson, G. (2018). Aristotle on Psychopathology. In: Kontos 2018a, pp. 122-49. 
Pellegrin, P. (2017a). L’Excellence menacée. Paris. 
Pellegrin, P. (2017b). Y a-t-il une sociobiologie aristotélicienne? In Güremen and Jaulin 2017, pp. 
13-30. 
Rabinoff, E. (2015). Rational and Non-rational Perception in Aristotle’s De Anima. Epoché 19, pp. 
297-309. 
Reeve, C. D. C. (1988). Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato’s Republic. Princeton. 
Reeve, C. D. C. (2018). Good and Bad in Aristotle. In: Kontos 2018a: 17-31. 
Richardson Lear, G. (2006). Aristotle on Moral Virtue and the Fine. In: R. Kraut, ed., The Blackwell 
Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Oxford, pp. 116-37. 
Schwitzgebel, E. (2007). Human Nature and Moral Education in Mencius, Xunzi, Hobbes, and 
Rousseau. History of Philosophy Quarterly 24. pp. 147-68.  
Sedley, D. N. (2007). Creationism and its Critics in Antiquity. Berkeley. 
43 
 
Sherman, N. (1985). Character, Planning, and Choice in Aristotle. The Review of Metaphysics 39, 
pp. 83-106.  
Silverman, A. (2007). Ascent and Descent: The Philosopher’s Regret. Social Philosophy and Policy 
24, pp. 40-69. 
Smith, A. D. (1996). Character and Intellect in Aristotle’s Ethics. Phronesis 41, pp. 56-74. 
Sorabji, R. K. (1995). Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate. 
Ithaca. 
Stavrianeas, S. (2018). The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Natural Teleology and its Failures in 
Aristotle. In: Kontos 2018a, pp. 51-71. 
Stocker, M. (1979). Desiring the Bad: An Essay in Moral Psychology. Journal of Philosophy 76, 
pp. 738-53. 
Sussman, D. (2009). For Badness’ Sake. The Journal of Philosophy 106, pp. 613-28. 
Thein, K. (2017). Aristotelés o lidské přirozenosti. Od myšlení k anatomii. Prague. 
Velleman, J. D. (1992). The Guise of the Good. Nous 26, pp. 3-26. 
Vlastos, G. (1939). The Disorderly Motion in the Timaeus. Classical Quarterly 33, pp. 71-83. 
White, S. A. (1992). Natural Virtue and Perfect Virtue in Aristotle. Proceedings of the Boston Area 
Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 8, pp. 135-68. 
Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. von (1919). Platon II. Berlin.  
Witt, C. (2012). Aristotle on Deformed Animal Kinds. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 43, pp. 
83-106. 
Wood, J. L. (2009). Is There an Archê Kakou in Plato? The Review of Metaphysics 63, pp. 349-84.  
